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This thesis examines three important topics related to credit markets using a unique 
and exhaustive dataset of loans from an emerging economy – Pakistan. The first 
topic relates to loan default resolution and access to fresh credit after the firm’s exit 
from default. This is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, which examines the 
role of collateral and interest rates in these two important events in the life of a firm. 
The second topic relates to the impact of “relationship lending” on collateral and 
interest rate levels. The previous empirical findings on this subject are mixed – some 
finding that the impact of relationship lending is beneficial to firms whilst others find 
it exploitative or negative. The results of the current study suggest that impact of 
relationship lending varies by types of financial institutions and firms and this in turn 
may be the cause of the tension in previous empirical findings. The third topic 
examines the impact of the relationship of a firm with the CEO of its bank on risk 
premium and collateral levels. This is the first study, to the best of my knowledge, 
which examines this relationship. 
Chapter 1 presents the introduction of the thesis. It describes the motivation 
for the thesis, summary of main findings and contribution to literature. The second 
Chapter examines loan default by firms and identifies the factors that influence both 
the default resolution process and firms’ access to fresh credit after firms exit default.  
The results suggest an important role for collateral. Collateral expedites both the 
default resolution process and access to fresh credit after exiting default. The 
findings of the Chapter also show that a higher interest rate increases the default 
duration. Relationships with multiple lenders as well as those with multiple branches 
of one lender are associated with obtaining fresh credit at the post default stage. 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of relationship lending on risk premium and 
collateral requirements. The results suggest that, on average, a longer relationship 
length has a positive relationship with higher interest rates but lower collateral levels.  
However, further examination paints a far more complex picture. The impact of 
relationship length on interest rates and collateral varies substantially with the type of 
lender and borrower as well as across different relationship dimensions. The findings 
strongly suggest that conflicting previous empirical findings on the subject of 
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relationship lending are probably the result of using datasets limited to certain types 
of borrower or financial institutions. 
  The fourth Chapter further enriches the examination of relationship lending 
by examining the role of relationship between a firm and the CEO of its bank. The 
results suggest that, on an aggregate level, a stronger relationship results in lower risk 
premia for firms’ loans; although there is no effect on collateral. However, the 
findings also show that the impact of these relationships vary by types of banks. 
 With explicit regard to publications, Chapter 2 forms the basis of the 
published journal article “Default Resolution and Access to Fresh Credit in an 
Emerging Market” in the Pacific-Basin Finance Journal (ABDC rank A). Another 
paper “Relationship Lending: A Source of Support or a Means of Exploitation? – 
Evidence from a Developing Economy” based on Chapter 3 has been presented at the 
Asian Finance Conference 2016 in Bangkok, the AFAANZ (Accounting and Finance 
Association in Australia and New Zealand) conference (2016, Gold Coast) and the 
Financial Markets and Corporate Governance conference (2016, Melbourne).  The 
paper is currently under review at an A* journal. At the time of writing this thesis, 
Chapter 4 is being readied as an independent paper to be submitted to a suitable 
highly-ranked journal in the near future. 
Whilst at Curtin university, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to work 
on two other projects not directly related to my thesis. The paper entitled “The 
Determinants of Digital Terrestrial Radio Aftermarket Coverage” co-authored with 
G. Madden and P. Kraipornsak was published in 2014 in the Applied Economics 
Letters.  The second paper “Spectrum Auction Designs and Revenue Variations” was 
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This dissertation examines two issues pertaining to loan defaults and relationship 
lending important to both academics and the professional community of bankers 
alike. The previous evidence on these issues is either limited or conflicting; 
furthermore, it predominantly relates to developed economies. We address these gaps 
in literature by using a unique dataset from Pakistan.   
The contribution of this work is twofold. Firstly it addresses important topics 
either with limited coverage in literature or with mixed findings using this unique 
dataset. Secondly it brings emerging economy perspective to these studies. This is 
important since country differences may strongly impact the implications of 
economic and financial relationships.  
 The dataset used in this dissertation has been obtained from the Credit 
Information Bureau (CIB) of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The SBP is the 
monetary authority as well as the bank regulator in Pakistan. All financial institutions 
in Pakistan are legally required to submit information about their credit transactions 
to the CIB at the end of each month. The dataset is thus exhaustive since it captures 
each and every loan generated in the economy of Pakistan. This incredibly rich 
dataset captures all of the relevant information about a loan such as the type of loan; 
sanctioned loan amount; interest rate; outstanding principal (loan amount withdrawn 
less any repayments); value and type of collateral; amounts overdue (amounts not 
paid by borrowers on due dates); any write-off availed by that borrower; amount 
under litigation; and so on. As of December 2013, the number of active borrowers in 
the CIB database was 34,470 for firms and about 3.9 million for individuals. An 
active status means that a borrower has an outstanding loan (not yet fully paid) from 
a financial institution. If a borrower has repaid all its loans, then it is no more active 
although its historical information is still retained in the database. The dataset 
consists of business loans to firms and covers the period from April 2006 to 
December 2013. April 2006 has been selected as starting point since the CIB started 
collecting data on interest rate from this date and information about this key variable 
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is not available for period prior to that. Further substantial changes in the definitions 
and codes of various variables were introduced by the CIB prior to April 2006 and 
hence data prior to April 2006 is not readily comparable with data after April 2006. 
The unit of analysis is lender-borrower-month and thus we aggregate the loans 
obtained by a borrower from a particular financial institution. The final dataset 
contains about 3.6 million observations.  
 
1.2 Findings and Contribution 
Chapter 2 examines loan default resolution and access to fresh credit for firms that 
exit default. Importantly, it is the first study that explores the role of collateral and 
interest rate in these two important events, which can have strong impacts both on 
the financial sector and overall economy of a country. An expeditious default 
resolution and access to fresh credit is beneficial both for the financial institutions 
and firms in an economy.  Bonfim et al. (2012) is the only study that examines these 
relationships by using a dataset from Portugal. However, this study does not look 
into the role of collateral and interest rate in default resolution nor does it consider 
these variables while evaluating access to fresh credit. 
The results suggest that collateral plays an important role both in an efficient 
default resolution process and a quick access to fresh credit after firms emerge from 
default. Higher interest rates make it difficult for firms to exit default. We also find 
that economic agents in Pakistan behave differently to those in Portugal. In contrast 
to Bonfim et al. (2012), who find that large firms exit default quickly, we observe 
that large firms in Pakistan spend more time in default resolution than small firms. 
We also find that firms in Pakistan need more time to access fresh credit after 
emerging from default than firms in Portugal. 
 Chapter 3 examines the impact of lender-borrower relationship on risk 
premium and collateral requirement for firms. The empirical evidence on this subject 
is mixed. Some studies suggest that a longer relationship with a financial institution 
is beneficial for firms in terms of lower risk premium and lower collateral 
requirements whereas other studies find that such relationship results in higher risk 
premium and higher collateral requirements. Kysucky and Norden (2015) analyse the 
results of 101 studies on this subject and suggest that the tension in empirical 
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findings is the result of country effects. Our findings, however, suggest that these 
differences may be a result of the particular dataset being used in these studies, 
which are invariably restricted to particular types of financial institutions and/or 
particular types of borrowers such as small firms or corporates.   
The exhaustive dataset allows us to explore the impact of relationship length 
across a variety of financial institutions as well as borrowers. The results suggest that 
the impact of relationship length varies substantially across different types of 
financial institutions and different types of borrowers. The results also suggest that it 
is beneficial for small firms to cultivate relationships with non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFIs) since it results in lower risk premiums and lower collateral 
requirements. Their longer relationships with banks, on the other hand, results in 
greater collateral requirement. The relationship of listed firms with large financial 
institutions are welfare enhancing whereas small banks charge higher risk premium 
from them as length of their relationships increases. The impact of longer 
relationships for Government firms is either insignificant or exploitative across all 
types of lenders. 
 Chapter 4 continues the analysis of relationship lending. In addition to the 
impact of bank-borrower relationship, this Chapter examines the impact of 
relationship of a listed firm with the CEO of its bank on risk premium and collateral 
requirement. On an aggregate level (when we do not segregate data by type of 
banks), the results suggest that the longer the relationship of a listed firm with the 
CEO of its bank, the lower will be the risk premium, but with no effect on the 
collateral requirement. However, further analysis reveal that impact of this 
relationship varies by type of banks. A longer relationship with CEOs of banks 
results in lower risk premium across all types of banks except foreign banks and 
small banks.1 Further, longer relationships with CEOs of small banks result in lower 




                                                 
1 We divide banks into Government banks, private banks, domestic banks, foreign banks, large banks 
and small banks. 
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1.3 Background Information about Pakistan 
In addition to providing a unique dataset, Pakistan is an important and interesting 
emerging economy. It is the 6th largest country in terms of population with about 
180 million people, and is ranked 35 in the world in terms of area and 45 in terms of 
GDP (at around US$233 billion for the year 2014).2 In 2012, the Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE), the largest stock exchange in Pakistan, ranked at 50 in terms of 
market capitalization. However, Pakistan lags far behind in terms of other 
development indicators. Its per capita income for year 2014 at US$1,410 places it in 
the category of lower middle income countries. It stands at the 110th position for ease 
of doing business and at the 167th position in terms of enforcing a 
contract.3 Corruption is a major issue in Pakistan as reflected in its ranking of 127th 
position in terms of corruption perception index by Transparency International.4 
The total assets of the financial sector in Pakistan are around 57% of its 
GDP.5 The financial sector consists of banks, development financial institutions 
(DFIs), microfinance banks, investment banks, leasing companies, housing finance 
companies, modarabas (an Islamic form of mutual funds) and insurance companies. 
Another important player in the financial sector is Central Directorate of National 
Savings (CDNS) which mobilizes savings on behalf of the Government of Pakistan 
through distributing various types of government securities to individuals as well as 
firms. In terms of number of various types of financial institutions, the financial 
sector in Pakistan is quite diversified, there are: 38 banks; 47 insurance companies; 8 
DFIs; 7 investment banks; 9 leasing companies and 26 modarabas. However, in 
reality, the financial sector is dominated by commercial banks as they constitute 73% 
of the financial sector in terms of assets. 
Comprehensive banking reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s transformed 
the banking system from a predominantly Government owned sector (more than 80% 
in terms of assets) to a privately owned and controlled banking system (more than 
                                                 
2 IMF world economic outlook database accessed on 19th November 2015, available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx.  
3 Ease of business doing report by World Bank accessed on 19th November 2015, available 
athttp://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-
Reports/English/DB15-Chapters/DB15-Report-Overview.pdf 
4 Corruption perception index by Transparency International is available at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results.  




78% of the banking assets are now under the private sector control). There are two 
regulators of the financial sector. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) regulates banks, 
DFIs and microfinance banks whereas Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (SECP) regulates insurance companies, investment banks, leasing 
companies, discount houses and so on. 
 Note that although the subsequent research chapters are more-or-less self-











DEFAULT RESOLUTION AND ACCESS TO FRESH CREDIT IN AN 
EMERGING MARKET 
(This Chapter forms the basis of the published article “Default Resolution 
and Access to Fresh Credit in an Emerging Market” in the Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal – Hussain et. al (2016)) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Failure to repay loans is at the core of banking crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
The net costs of resolving banking crises have been estimated at about 13.3% of 
GDP, with these costs much higher in emerging economies (Laeven and Valencia, 
2008). An efficient default resolution mechanism is in the interest of every economic 
agent, be it banks, businesses or the economy as a whole. Tedious, time consuming 
and unsuccessful default negotiations are costly to both banks (in the form of loan 
losses) and firms (through higher risk of insolvency and reputational loss), as well as 
to the economy as a whole (Hart and Moore (1998) observe that post default lack of 
trust between lender and borrower causes the liquidation of many viable businesses). 
Since bank credit is a dominant source of funds for businesses in emerging 
economies (Fan et al., 2012), access to fresh loans after default resolution is critical 
for the very survival of firms. Both default resolution and access to fresh credit after 
exiting default thus have strong linkages with financial stability and economic 
growth. 
Despite the importance of default resolution and access to fresh credit for 
defaulting firms, these subjects have received only limited attention in the literature. 
While reorganizations under formal insolvencies regimes like Chapter 11 have been 
examined in detail, there have been few studies on corporate default resolution 
through private channels.6 Two studies though have examined formal versus 
informal resolutions: Blazy et al. (2014) find that larger loans with long term 
maturities are restructured through private negotiations; whereas Hotchkiss et al. 
(2014) observe that firms backed by private equity also prefer informal channels for 
loan renegotiations. A few other studies have examined the role of particular 
variables of interest on default resolution: Bester (1994), in a theoretical paper, 
                                                 




argues that collateral helps renegotiations; however, Karagozoglu et al. (2008) find 
that collateral increases the probability of liquidation in case of default; and Chan et 
al. (2014) examine mortgage loans and find that loans of borrowers with low credit 
scores are more likely to be restructured. 
The topic of access to fresh credit after default resolution is reported in the 
literature even less than default resolution. To the best of our knowledge, Bonfim et 
al. (2012) present the only study on this topic. They find that most of the borrowers 
in Portugal are able to maintain access to credit even after default; however, few of 
them are able to get fresh loans. The large firms having multiple credit relationships 
are in a better position to access credit markets after clearing default. Further, access 
to credit becomes difficult if default is with the main bank of the borrower or if the 
duration of default is long. Bonfim et al. (2012) study, however, does not examine 
the role of collateral and interest rates in default resolution nor does it consider these 
variables while evaluating access to fresh credit: these variables are not available in 
the dataset. Our study, in contrast, is the first to examine the role of collateral and 
interest rate in default resolution and access to fresh credit. This study assesses the 
impact of a variety of variables on default resolution and access to fresh credit and 
find that size of borrowings, collateral, relationship with banks and severity of 
default affect both the period firms remain in default and their ability to access fresh 
credit. 
We use a unique dataset of all loans in Pakistan, from April 2006 to 
December 2013.7 Our dataset has been sourced from the Credit Information Bureau 
(CIB) of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP).8 All financial institutions in Pakistan are 
legally obligated to report complete information about their borrowers to CIB on a 
monthly basis and thus the database covers every firm which has availed itself 
of any financing facility from any financial institution in Pakistan.9 The limited 
                                                 
7 Pakistan is the 6th largest country in terms of population with around 180 million people. It stands at 
35th position in terms of area and at 45th position in terms of GDP at around US$ 233 billion (IMF 
World Economic Outlook – April 2015). The Karachi Stock Exchange is the largest stock exchange in 
Pakistan, ranked at 50th position in terms of market capitalization (WDI report by World Bank 
available athttp://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/WDI-2013-ebook.pdf accessed on 
November 29, 2014). 
8 The State Bank of Pakistan is the central bank of the country entrusted with dual responsibilities of 
conducting monetary policy as well as banking supervision in Pakistan. 
9 Financial institutions under the regulatory domain of the SBP are obliged to provide credit 
information under Section 25A of the Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962. Further, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has also advised financial institutions falling under its 
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research on bank-borrower post default relationships and subsequent access to credit 
after default resolution could be due to the nature of the required data. The number of 
defaults is generally a very small percentage of total credit transactions. As a result, 
even if one is able to gain access to the complete records of one or even a few banks, 
the small number of observations makes a meaningful analysis difficult. We 
overcome the limitations of data availability by examining all the credit transactions 
in an economy. 
Bonfim et al. (2012) provides first evidence on the impact of severity of 
default and size of borrowings on ability of firms to access fresh credit.  Collateral 
and interest rate may be considered most important features of a credit contract and 
we explore the impact of these variables on the ability of firms to obtain fresh credit 
after exiting default.  Unfortunately, there is no theoretical literature underpinning 
this research.  A logical argument can, however, be built that a borrower with the 
ability to offer higher collateral should be able to access fresh loan quickly. 
Our contribution to the literature is three fold. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that examines the impact of collateral and interest 
rate on default resolution and access to fresh credit after clearing default. More 
importantly, in addition to examining the collateral per se, our dataset allows us to 
consider the role of different types of collateral in default resolution and access to 
fresh credit. Secondly, this study examines default resolution and access to credit 
from the perspective of a developing country. The design and enforcement of 
creditor rights in a country can have a material impact on economic relationships (la 
Porta et al., 1998). As we explain in Section 2.6.1, the judicial system in Pakistan is 
inefficient and susceptible to pressure. Thirdly, we are able to examine the role of 
relationships in default resolution and access to fresh credit. Our dataset allows us to 
test the proposition of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) that credit relationships with 
more banks are associated with inefficient reorganization because of coordination 
problems. 
Our results suggest that defaulters in Pakistan behave differently to those in 
Portugal as studied by Bonfim et al. (2012). Indeed, in contrast to Bonfim et al. 
(2012), who observe that default duration is shorter for large firms, we find that 
                                                                                                                                          




larger borrowers take more time for default resolution. This is consistent with 
institutional differences in both countries.10 The Pakistani dataset allows us to 
precisely determine when a borrower obtains fresh credit after clearing default. We 
consider a firm having accessed fresh credit after clearing default only when it 
obtains a new loan.11 We find that borrowers in Pakistan need more time (10 months 
for first 25% firms) to access fresh loans after default resolution than the borrower in 
Portugal (6 months for first 25% firms). 
The Pakistani dataset also provides information on collateral and interest 
rates (factors which could not be considered by Bonfim et al.). We find that the 
collateral is helpful in both expediting the default resolution process and in 
establishing access to fresh credit after exiting default. Regarding the effect of types 
of collateral, we observe that mortgages of both the residential and commercial 
property are helpful in resolving default. Higher interest rates increase the duration of 
default, suggesting that the higher credit pricing makes it difficult for a borrower in 
distress to service the loan and come out of default quickly. Interest rates do not play 
any significant role in accessing fresh credit after default resolution. Contrary to the 
notion that banks can lend to higher risk customers by charging greater risk 
premium, financial institutions in Pakistan perhaps decline the customers considered 
bad credit risk by them as observed by Stiglitz and Wejss (1983). 
Default with more than one financial institution makes default resolution 
difficult perhaps owing to coordination problems among lenders (Brunner and 
Krahnen, 2008). We however, also observe a similar effect when a borrower in 
default has a credit relationship with a higher number of branches of the lender, or is 
availing multiple financing products from it. This shows that coordination can be a 
problem not only between lenders but also between branches of one financial 
institution. Quite understandably, however, the adverse impact of dealing with 
multiple branches is much milder as compared to dealing with many financial 
institutions (the hazard ratio of ‘bank relationships in default’ is 0.395 as against 
0.828 for ‘number of branches’). Higher numbers of credit relationships both with 
                                                 
10 As we explain in Section 2.6.1, large borrowers can exploit the weak creditor rights regime and 
Pakistan’s inefficient judicial system. 
11 This definition is stricter than Bonfim et al. (2012) who define access as availability of any sort of 
financing facility after clearing default “broad access” or an increase in the total credit 
outstanding “strict access”.  Total credit outstanding may simply increase because of accrual of 
interest and may not actually reflect the borrower’s ability to access fresh credit. 
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financial institutions and their branches, however, are quite useful when it comes to 
obtaining new loans after resolving default. The findings of this paper shed light on 
two important facets of the bank-firm relationship and identify factors that facilitate 
or hamper the path to default resolution and access to fresh credit after the default 
episode is over. These findings can help both banks and firms in charting their course 
of action during this tumulus period of their journey. The results might also be used 
by policy makers, especially in emerging economies, to design appropriate 
frameworks for default resolution and rehabilitation of sick businesses. 
 
2.2 Relevant Literature 
Most of the studies on bank loan defaults have predominantly sought to identify 
determinants of default and estimate the probability of default (PD), loss given 
default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD).12 The primary aim of such studies is 
to assist banks in mitigating their credit risk or support them in adopting foundation 
and advanced internal rating based approaches for determining their credit risk under 
Basel Capital Accord II and III.13 
Another stream of literature has dealt with businesses in distress especially 
insolvencies under Chapter 11.14 There are, however, only a few studies that have 
looked into loan default resolution through private bilateral negotiations between 
banks and borrowers. Comparing formal versus informal distress resolution, Blazy et 
al. (2014) find that larger loans and long term maturities are associated with direct 
negotiations with lenders while Hotchkiss et al. (2014) observe that firms backed by 
private equity prefer informal channel and achieve resolution quickly as compared to 
other firms. 
Examining the impact of defaults on firms in a theoretical model, Stiglitz and 
Wejss (1983), observe that banks will deny credit to defaulters rather than penalizing 
them through higher interest rates. Hart and Moore (1998) provide a theoretical 
                                                 
12 PD – Probability of default is the likelihood that the borrower will not meet their debt obligations 
as they become due. EAD – Exposure at default is the borrower’s total indebtedness at the time of 
default and LGD – loss given default is the net loss borne by the bank after netting off any recoveries 
made out of collateral. 
13 As a sample of such studies, please see Bastos (2010); Qi and Zhao (2011); Bellotti and Crook 
(2012) and Loterman et al. (2012). 
14 Chapter 11 is a component of US bankruptcy code that governs reorganization of a firm. 
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argument that lack of credibility between lenders and borrowers after a default 
results in an inefficient and premature liquidation of an otherwise viable project, 
exposing both the bank and the entrepreneur to losses. Brown et al. (2006) suggest 
that prospects of loan restructuring encourage borrowers to commit strategic default 
even when they are in a position to repay the loan. 
Examining the role of write-offs in renegotiations, Gorton and Kahn 
(2000) observe that debt forgiveness reduces a borrower’s incentive to take on more 
risk and thus is in the interest of the lenders. Franks and Sussman (2005) find that 
while banks extend the repayment period to help the borrowers in difficult situations, 
they do not offer any write off to reduce the burden on such borrowers. Examining 
distressed mortgage loans, Chan et al. (2014) find that borrowers with low credit 
scores at the time of origination of loans are better placed to get their loans 
restructured. The examination of the role of collateral in distress resolution has 
yielded mixed findings. Bester (1994) finds that collateral facilitates debt 
renegotiation and modification of the terms of the credit. However, Karagozoglu et 
al. (2008) find that collateral increases the threat of liquidation whereas high 
leverage leads to reorganization. 
Examining the violations of debt contract by firms in an empirical study, Sufi 
(2009) find that such firms have lower access to credit. Roberts and Sufi 
(2009a) reveal that, in addition to a substantial negative impact on the future credit 
raising capacity of the borrower, violation of any provision of a debt contract also 
leads to higher interest rates. Roberts and Sufi (2009b) find that the majority (over 
90%) of long term loans are renegotiated during their life because of macroeconomic 
changes and variations in borrowers’ profiles. Default and financial distress were 
rarely the cause for renegotiation. 
One aspect of loan defaults that has received limited academic attention is the 
access to fresh credit after resolving default. Analysing loans granted to countries 
after sovereign default, Sol (2009) observe that additional information acquired by 
lenders during the default helps them to extend fresh loans to such 
countries.15 Bonfim et al. (2012) present the only study that examines corporate 
default resolution as well as access to fresh credit after the default is over. Bonfim et 
al. (2012) use an economy wide dataset of loans from Portugal and find that 50% of 
                                                 
15 The study examines default by Governments and not by firms. 
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the firms are able to resolve their default within about one year. Default duration 
increases with time and resolution may take many years if the firm stays in default 
beyond one year. Larger borrowers are able to achieve default resolution quickly and 
higher overdue amounts at the start of default result in a longer duration of default. 
On the question of access to credit after clearing default, the study finds that most of 
the firms are able to maintain their access to bank loans, although only 25% of them 
are able to obtain fresh credit. Higher overdue amounts and a longer stay in default 
make access to fresh credit more difficult. Larger borrowers are able to regain access 
to the credit markets quickly. 
Some of our findings match with those of Bonfim et al. (2012) while others 
differ. Access to fresh credit after clearing default appears to be more difficult in 
Pakistan. Further, we find that large borrowers in fact take more time for default 
resolution. Our results regarding the adverse impact of higher overdue amounts and 
smaller size of loans on access to fresh credit are consistent with their findings. 
 
2.3. The Data 
The dataset for this study has been sourced from the Credit Information Bureau 
(CIB) of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The State Bank of Pakistan is the central 
bank of Pakistan and is entrusted with the dual responsibility of conducting monetary 
policy as well as supervising banking sector in Pakistan. This study uses the CIB 
dataset for firms from April 2006 to December 2013. April 2006 has been selected as 
the starting point since there have been relatively few and minor changes in the 
reporting formats since this date and thus the definitions and codes are consistent 
over the period April 2006 - December 2013. In addition, the CIB started collecting 
information about collateral and interest rates in April 2006: these being key 
variables for our study. 
As of December 2013, the CIB database contained information concerning 
34,470 active firms and about 3.9 million individual borrowers. An active status 
means that the borrower owes some money to a bank. If a borrower has fully repaid 
all its loans, it is no longer active, although its information is still retained in the 
system. Using the unique identifiers for each borrower and financial institution, we 
aggregate the loans extended by a particular financial institution to a particular 
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borrower. Our primary unit of analysis is thus bank-borrower-month and our final 
dataset contains about 3.6 million observations. Since we have a panel dataset where 
observations are repeated each month, we measure our variables at the end of each 
month. For example, for variable ‘number of banks’, we count the number of bank 
relationships each borrower has, at the end of each month. Note that the CIB does not 
collect accounting data and we are unable to augment our analysis with potentially 
important additional information relating to the firm, for example those related to the 
firm’s financial statement(s). This is similar to Bonfim et al. (2012), the closest 
published study to the current paper, who also do not incorporate financial data. Our 
estimations, however, do exploit the panel nature of the data by employing a random 
effects specification, explicitly controlling for any such unobserved firm-specific 
heterogeneity. 
Table 2.1 lists the research variables and their definitions while Table 
2.2 presents summary statistics. We do not scale variables in this paper but rather we 
use variables capturing the size of the loan in our set of explanatory 
variables.  Pearson (1896), Kronmal (1993), Barth and Kallapur (1996), Kim (1999), 
Zhu (2012), Bonaimé et al. (2014) and Dang et al. (2014) highlight the risk of 
spurious correlations associated with scaling. The size of the loan has been found to 
influence the type of renegotiation in cases of default (Blazy et al., 2014). In addition 
to the outstanding amount of the loan we also use the loan limit sanctioned for each 
firm and the number of loans made as our independent variables. The mean and 
standard deviation of all the three variables depict substantial dispersion while 
percentiles indicate the data is dominated by smaller borrowers. About 75% of firms 
borrow less than PKR 19.15 million (equivalent to about US$ 183,000).16 Against 
this backdrop, a mean value of PKR 65 million (equivalent to US$ 617,000) also 




                                                 
16 SBP PKR-US$ exchange rate on 31st December 2013 obtained from SBP 
websitehttp://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/rates/m2m/M2M-History.asp has been used for conversion of 





Variables and their Descriptions 
No. Name of the variable Description 
 Dependent Variables  
1 Time to exit from default 
 
The variable measures duration of default.  
In other words, the time it takes for a 
borrower to come out of default.  It is 
measured in number of months, starting 
from the month a borrower is reported in 
default by a financial institution till the time 
it is reported as regular. 
2 Time to access to fresh credit 
after exiting default 
The time it takes, in months, for a borrower 
to obtain a new loan from a financial 
institution, after the default is cleared. 
   
 Size of the Borrowings  
3 Principal The outstanding amount of the loan owed by 
a borrower to a financial institution 
4 Limit The loan limit sanctioned by the financial 
institution to a borrower.  This is the 
maximum amount that can be withdrawn by 
a borrower under a loan contract. 
5 Number of loans Number of loans availed of by the borrower 
from a particular financial institution 
   
 Collateral  
6 Total collateral Total value of collateral held by the 
financial institution as security against loans 
of a particular borrower 
7 Liquid collateral The best quality collateral that can be 
converted into cash without loss of 
substantial time and erosion in the value of 
security. It includes deposits under lien, 
precious metals, Government securities and 
shares of listed companies 
8 Residential mortgage 
 
The value of residential land and building 
mortgaged to the financial institution as 
security against loans 
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9 Commercial mortgage The value of commercial land and property 
mortgaged to the financial institution as 
security against loans 
10 Pledged stock The value of stock (raw material, work in 
process, finished goods, merchandise, etc.) 
under the control of the financial institution, 
held as security against loans 
11 Other collateral All other types of collateral excluding the 
above categories 
12 Types of collateral 
 
Number of types of collateral offered by a 
borrower to a financial institution 
 Credit Relationships  
13 Number of banks 
 
Number of financial institutions with which 
a borrower has lending relationships at the 
end of a particular month 
14 Number of branches Number of branches of a particular financial 
institution with which a borrower has a 
credit relationship at the end of a particular 
month 
15 Mainbank (dummy) A dummy variable that identifies the main 
bank (the financial institution that has 
granted maximum aggregate loan limits to 
the borrower) if the borrower has lending 
relationship with more than one financial 
institutions 
16 Number of products 
 
Number of types of financing products (like 
term loans, running finance, TFC, bonds, 
etc.)  availed of by a borrower from a 
financial institution 
 Other variables  
17 Rating (dummy) 
 
A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
borrower is rated either externally or 
internally by its lender 
18 
 
Maturity of loan 
 
It is tenure of the loan and is measured as 
the number of months when a loan becomes 
due. 
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19 Islamic bank (dummy) A dummy variable with the value of  1 if the 




20 Total overdues Total overdue amounts include principal, 
interest or any other amount owed to the 
bank and not paid by the due date 
21 Write offs Write offs include any amounts written off 
by the bank out of its claim on the borrower 
22 Number of bank relationships 
in default 
Number of financial institutions with which 
a borrower is in default at the end of the 
reporting month 
23 FSV of collateral Value of the collateral, assessed by an 
independent expert under the guidelines 
issued by SBP, which can be fetched in a 
forced sale 
24 Amount in litigation The amount claimed by the bank in recovery 
proceedings against a borrower in a court of 
law 
 Credit Pricing  
25 Interest rate The rate charged on the loan by a financial 
institution 
Note: This Table presents definitions of the variables used in analyses.  The explanatory variables 
have been grouped into five categories:  size of the borrowings, collateral, credit relationships, other 








Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables Excluding Dummies 
 




  p_10 p_25 p_50 p_75 p_90 
 
Dependent Variables        
        
Time to exit from default 
(Number of months) 32.62 29.09 2 7 25 52 83 
 
Time to access fresh credit 
(Number of months) 22.50 18.04 4 8 17 33 49 
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         7.63          76.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00           3.70 
Write off amounts 
         0.02            2.73 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Number of bank relationships in 
default 
         0.63            1.80 0.00 0.00 0.00           1.00           1.00 
Forced sale value of collateral 
       12.90        232.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00           1.00 
Amount in litigation 
    8.14      1520.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
Credit Pricing   
Interest rate 
    14.66           3.94  10.00 12.47   14.83  16.95 19.00 
Note: This Table presents descriptive statistics for variables (excluding dummies) used in the analysis. 
 
Collateral impacts the probability of default as well as the result of 
renegotiation in cases of default (Berger et al., 2016; Bester, 1994). There are 30 
different types of collateral captured by the dataset. Given the lower number of 
observations for many categories and overlapping definitions, we have decided to 
broadly divide collateral into five categories, combining the types that have common 
characteristics from the perspective of quality of collateral. 
Deposits under lien, certificate of deposits, precious metals and ornaments, 
listed debt securities and listed equities are categorized as liquid collateral. Liquid 
collateral can be readily converted into cash and is available to settle the bank’s 
claim against the borrower without the need to go to a court of law. Residential 
mortgages include residential lands and buildings offered as security and likewise 
commercial mortgages include the mortgage of commercial land and 
buildings. Pledged stocks are raw material, work in process and finished goods 
offered as collateral, with the distinguishing feature that these stocks are under the 
control of the bank and are released to the borrower with the permission of the bank. 
Commercial mortgages are the second largest category at 8.8%, followed by 
residential mortgages, with its share at 3.2%. The most valuable and useful category, 
that is liquid collateral, constitutes only 2.3% of total collateral. The last category 
termed “other collateral” contains all the remaining 19 types of collateral, such as 
unrated debt securities, unlisted equities, mortgage of plant and machinery, 
guarantees, hypothecation, charge over assets, and lien on documents, which are 
relatively difficult to value, repossess and sell off in case of default. However, this 
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category is also the dominant type of collateral, constituting about 83.9% of the total 
collateral. 
Multiple lending relationships of a firm are associated with better credit 
quality (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996) although coordination problems among banks 
may reduce the probability of resolution in cases of default (Brunner and Krahnen, 
2008). Further, the chances of resolution decrease if the main bank handles the 
negotiation in cases involving multiple lenders (Blazy et al., 2014). In addition to the 
number of bank relationships and the main bank, we also use the number of branches 
of a financial institution with which a firm conducts credit transactions as well as the 
number of different types of products it uses to raise financing. The dummy variable 
`Main bank’ identifies the credit transaction in our dataset being carried out with the 
bank from which borrower is availing maximum credit limits. We have preferred to 
use sanctioned limits for determining the main bank of a borrower since loan limits 
are sanctioned for a fixed term and generally remain unchanged over a period of 
time, while the principal outstanding varies substantially. Summary statistics 
in Table 2.2 show that more than 50% of the observations in our dataset relate to 
borrowers dealing with only one bank, whereas the number of observations related to 
borrowers dealing with a single branch of a bank is even higher, at 90%. This 
indicates that, even when borrowers avail themselves of loans from more than one 
bank, they still prefer to deal with only one branch of a particular bank, perhaps 
because of familiarity with the branch officials or ease of access. 
The length and severity of default makes it difficult for firms both to resolve 
default as well as access fresh credit after clearing default (Bonfim et al., 2012). We 
use five ‘default variables’ to capture the post default position of a borrower. The 
mean value of PKR 0.02 million for write off against the mean of PKR 7.63 million 
for overdue amounts shows that only a small number of overdue accounts actually 
result in a loss for the banks. A relatively high mean for the amount in litigation at 
PKR 12.9 million shows that banks generally take relatively larger defaulters to 
court. This phenomenon could be the result of a rational calculation on the part of the 




Pakistan also has Islamic commercial banks and the dataset contains 
information about loans extended by them.17 The share of Islamic banks in the total 
credit of the economy, while growing, was still around 5% in year 2013. Although 
Islamic commercial banks extend loans in accordance with the principles of Islamic 
jurisprudence (Shariah), it has been found that risks and rewards for the customers of 
Islamic banks are similar to that of conventional banks (see for example, Khan 
(2010) and Chong and Liu (2009)). The Baele et al. (2014) study, however, reported 
a lower default rate for Islamic banks as compared to that for conventional banks in 
Pakistan.  In order to control this aspect, we have added a dummy variable ‘Islamic 
bank’ in our estimations. 
 
2.4 Characteristics of Default 
We consider a loan in default when it has been reported by the bank in any one of 
four categories –other assets especially mentioned, substandard, doubtful or 
loss.18 The State Bank of Pakistan has issued detailed regulations for the 
classification of loans and all banks are legally bound to follow these guidelines, 
ensuring uniformity of practices among financial institutions in Pakistan.19 The 
original dataset obtained from CIB includes both fund based (various types of loans 
and investments like running finance, term loans, leases, Term Finance Certificates, 
Sukooks,20 and so on) and non-fund based facilities (such as letters of credit 
and guarantees) extended to borrowers by the financial institutions. Since the default 
on a non-fund based facility may elicit a different type of response as compared to a 
loan default, this study only uses fund based facilities, that is, loans, for analysis. 
The dataset contains month wise information of all loans from April 2006 to 
December 2013. The position of total loans, as well as corresponding NPLs, is given 
in Table 2.3.   
 
                                                 
17 There were six Islamic banks in Pakistan as of 31st December 2013. 
18 We use the term loans in default or classified loans or NPLs (non-performing loans) 
interchangeably. 
19 For detail information, please see Prudential Regulations available at the SBP 
websitehttp://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/prudential/index.htm accessed on September 30, 2014. 




Position of the Total Loans and Non-Performing Loans during April 2006 - December 2013 
 
(Amounts are in Pakistan Rupees Billions) 
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Note: This Table presents a comparative position of loans extended to firms and loans of the whole banking system.  The banking system total loans include loans extended to firms 
as well as to individuals.  Only the principal portion of the loans outstanding at a particular date has been shown here.  The classified principal is the principal outstanding in respect 








The Position of Regular vs. Defaulted Loans 
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Note: This Table presents the comparative position of regular loans and loans in default on certain dates.  The loans in default are the loans reported as classified by financial 
institution in any category of classification, namely other assets especially mentioned, substandard, doubtful or loss.  The terms ‘loans in default’, ‘defaulted loans’ and ‘classified 





The NPL to loan ratio of the entire banking system descended to its lowest 
level of 6.9% in December 2006 and then it gradually ascended to its peak at 15.7% 
in December 2011, after which it gradually levelled off to 13% in December 2013. 
Borrowings by firms also closely followed this trajectory, with NPLs peaking at 
15.5% in December 2011 and then declining gradually. In terms of absolute 
numbers, the NPLs of the banking system attained their maximum level of PKR 615 
billion in December 2012, after which they declined to PKR 585 billion in December 
2013. The period under our examination, therefore, includes a variety of scenarios 
and should provide useful insight into the behaviour of banks and borrowers during a 
period of heightened concerns about the quality of loan portfolios. 
The period covered in the study also coincides with the onset of the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2007-08, which had a substantial adverse effect on the economy 
of Pakistan (Jamali and Waseemuddin, 2011; Latif et al., 2011). 
In order to understand the dynamics of default, we provide in Table 2.4 some 
basic statistics and comparative information for loans in the regular category and the 
loans in default The average values in Table 2.4 calculated on the basis of mean and 
median narrate different stories. To start with, while the mean value of a loan almost 
doubled from PKR 22.27 million on 30th April 2006 to PKR 45.63 million at the end 
of 2013, the median value showed a negligible increase. This indicates that 
borrowing by larger borrowers increased while lending to small borrowers remained 
more or less at the same level during this period. The mean values of loans in default 
ranged from PKR 8.35 million to PKR 25.14 million as against a range of PKR 24.69 
million to PKR 52.50 million for regular loans, thus suggesting that firms which 
succumb to default are small borrowers. However, the median values of loans in 
default (from PKR 1.16 million to PKR 2.89 million) are higher than those of regular 
loans (from PKR 1.19 million to PKR 0.39 million). These differences are 
unconditional and we will present a model of conditional default probabilities below 
which will help resolve the seemingly inconsistent picture that emerges from 
inspection of the summary statistics in Table 2.4. 
The collateral to loan ratio ranged from 3.6 to 2.11 during the period under 
examination. Based on our discussions with regulators, we interpret this high level of 
collateral ratio an outcome of an inefficient judicial system (discussed in Section 
2.6.1). During lengthy legal proceedings, the value of collateral may decline due to a 
number of reasons, for example, obsolescence, depreciation, theft and so on. In order 
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to compensate for this likely decline, financial institutions require higher levels of 
collateral from their borrowers. 
We also observe that most of the default resolutions in Pakistan are achieved 
through private negotiations rather than judicial proceedings. Out of 17,040 cases of 
default resolutions in our dataset, only 940 cases (5.5%) were under litigation prior to 
resolution. However, we cannot state with certainty that even in these 940 cases, 
resolution was achieved through a court decision. Sometimes, lenders and borrowers 
reach out of court settlement while the legal proceedings are underway. Given the 
overwhelming majority of private resolutions in our dataset, we assume that our 
analysis and findings mainly pertain to private default resolutions. 
 
2.5 Estimation Methodology 
We utilize survival analysis technique for modelling data since our dependent 
variable(s) of interest are duration of default and time to access fresh credit after 
clearing default. It is also considered an appropriate choice for modelling 
longitudinal data, especially with censoring problems (Mills, 2011). In contrast to 
logistic regression that uses a binary output, survival analysis models use time to 
event of interest, which is more informative since it takes into account both the time 
to the event and probability of occurring of the event. A logistic regression model, in 
our case for example, would have treated a default that occurred after one month 
exactly the same as a default that occurred after one year. The proportional hazard 
model has been found to outperform logistic regression when occurrence of the event 
is not rare and the time to the event is long (Green and Symons, 1983). 
The data are an unbalanced panel but the nature of the data introduces left 
and right censoring. Left censored observations are loans which had already 
experienced the event that we are trying to model, before the start of the observation 
period, i.e., April 2006. Right censoring occurs because we do not observe the 
subjects after a certain date. Following common practice in literature, we drop the 
left censored observations while right censoring is not considered a major problem in 
survival analysis and most of the econometric tools including the semi parametric 
Cox proportional hazard model we employ can take care of this issue (Guo, 2010). 
The Cox proportional hazard model estimates the hazard function using partial 
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likelihood method wihtout the need to make any assumption about baseline hazard 
(Cleves et al., 2008). The Cox proportional hazard model (Eq. 1) is estimated for the 
duration of the default and access to fresh credit after default: 
h(t|x)= h0(t)exp(x,β).                                                                      (1) 
In the equation shown above, h0 is the unspecified baseline hazard function, x 
is the vector of covariates and β is coefficient vector. One major advantage of using 
the Cox proportional hazard model is that it does not require any prior assumption 
about the shape of the baseline hazard. 
Our first endogenous variable, duration of default, is the time that a borrower 
has been in default and is measured in number of months. It is the period when a 
borrower is reported in default by a financial institution till the time it is reported as 
regular. For example, if a borrower was reported in default for January 2008 and then 
reported as regular for August 2008, duration of default for this borrower would be 7 
months. The second endogenous variable, time to access fresh credit after clearing 
default, measures the number of months it takes to obtain a new loan after a borrower 
has exited default. In the previous example, if the borrower having exited default in 
August 2008, obtains a new loan in June 2009, time to access fresh credit would be 
10 months. 
Our original dataset contains information for each loan obtained by a 
borrower. If a borrower has three loans from a bank, our dataset would have three 
observations for that borrower. However, a loan in itself is a transitory phenomenon 
since, in the normal course of the business, it is repaid and then a new loan is 
generated. As we are interested in observing the dynamics of a bank and borrower 
relationship, we collapse loan level data to the bank-borrower level by aggregating 
all the loans obtained from one bank by a particular borrower. Our primary unit of 
analysis is thus borrower-bank-month and the collapsed dataset contains about 3.6 
million observations. 
We proceed in the following manner for our analyses. Initially, we restrict 
our dataset to only the first default. All delinquents, by construction, must be in 
default a first time. Excluding subsequent defaults allows us to concentrate on this 
significant event for firms and also forestalls any confounding effects due to 
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recidivism. This analysis is thus confined to the duration of the first default and 
access to fresh credit after clearing the first default only. However, we later relax this 
restriction and include all subsequent defaults as well. This larger dataset allows us 
to consider if our decision to exclude subsequent defaults has a material effect on the 
inferences we draw. In these two analyses, we use nominal data. We present the 
results of these analyses in Panel A of Tables 2.5 and 2.6. We also re-estimate the 
samples after deflating monetary variables using the GDP deflator and converting 
nominal interest rates into real interest rates by use of the consumer price 
index.21 We present these results in Panel B of Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Overall, our main 
findings are unaffected by these robustness checks. 
We estimate several variants of the model, expanding the set of explanatory 
variables to develop a fuller picture of the influences on the dependent variable. We 
begin by estimating the Cox model with total collateral offered by a borrower to a 
bank to assess the impact of collateral per se. We then re-estimate the model using 
five different categories of collateral: – liquid collateral, residential mortgages, 
commercial mortgages, pledged stock and other collateral – in place of total 
collateral. This allows us to assess the efficacy and role played by different types of 
collateral in default resolution and access to fresh credit after clearing default. We 
then augment these models with the interest rate pertaining to the loan. Data on 
interest rates are available only for about 43% of observations but the data does not 
appear to be systematically missing (hence, a Heckman-like correction is not 
warranted). Both the performing and non-performing loans have more or less the 
same level of non-reporting of interest rates. There is neither any incentive or benefit 
nor any deterrence or threat to the bank related to reporting of interest rates: in 
Pakistan, banks are free to charge any interest rate considered appropriate by them. 
 
2.6 Estimation Results 
Our discussion of estimation results starts with the presentation of the Kaplan-Meier 
(KM) estimate, which is non-parametric tool and yields an unconditional probability 
of survival at time t. The Kaplan-Meier measures, at the end of each time interval, 
                                                 
21 The consumer price index and the GDP deflator have been obtained from the website of the State 
Bank of Pakistan http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata on 30th September 2014. 
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the fraction of subjects surviving for a certain amount of time (Cleves et al., 2008).22 
For failure events defined as ‘exit from default’ and ‘access to fresh credit after 
clearing default’, KM estimate provides us an assessment of duration of default and 
time it takes for firms to access fresh credit after exiting default.23 
We then follow up this discussion with the results of Cox Proportional 
Hazard Model, which are presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. As explained in Section 
2.5, we run the estimations using both the nominal as well as real values of the 
variables. The Panel A of these tables present results for estimations with nominal 
values of the variables whereas Panel B lists results when we use real values of the 
variables. The first set of estimations (first four columns) in each panel contains 
results where analysis has been confined to the first default only. For example, 
for ‘exit from default’, we take into account only the first default of a firm and its 
resolution, ignoring subsequent defaults and any resolutions thereof. Likewise, 
for ‘access to fresh credit’, we use information about exit from first default and 
access to fresh credit after this default, ignoring subsequent defaults, exits and access 
to fresh loans after these events. This constraint is then removed in second set of 
estimations (last four columns), which uses first as well as all the subsequent 
defaults, exits from defaults and accesses to credit after all exits. 
As explained in Section 2.5, we use numerous (16) different specifications of 
the model to estimate our variables of interest. The significance, sign and size of 
hazard ratios of almost all the variables, as shown in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, remain the 
same across all these specification, reflecting the robustness of our results.24 
 
2.6.1 Exit from Default 
The first aspect that we examine is when companies come out of default after 
committing default. A borrower may exit default by paying off the overdue amounts 
                                                 
22 Unlike a simple graph of firms versus length of time in default, the Kaplan-Meier estimate takes 
into account right censoring, which occurs in our dataset as some of the firms exit without 
experiencing failure event. 
23 Failure event is the event of interest that we intend to examine and is the term commonly used in 
survival analysis. 
24 The reported standard errors in the paper have been calculated using conventional estimates for the 
variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients. However, the results with a range of standard errors 




or through rescheduling or restructuring of its loan.25 We consider a borrower having 
exited default once it is reported as regular after being in default by the lending 
institution.  Figure 2.1 provides the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate for exit from 
default. 
As we can see from Figure 2.1, the probability of exiting default drops with 
time. In the first five months, about 25% of defaults are cleared. However, it takes 
another 25 months to clear the next 25% of the defaults. Default duration thereafter 
increases with time. Our findings are close to those of Bonfim et al. (2012), who 
observe that 25% of the defaults are resolved in one or two quarters and 50% of the 
defaults are cleared within the first five quarters. They also observe that the defaults 
which are not cleared in one year take many years to resolve. 
Figure 2.1: Exit from Default 
 
Note: Analysis time reflects number of months since default.  The survival estimate yields the 
probability of surviving till time t.  In the current scenario, the survival estimate is the probability of 
remaining in default till time t. 
 
Table 2.5 summarizes the results of estimations for duration of default. This 
set of estimations assesses the impact of exogenous variables on time (t) for which a 
firm remains in default. 
 
                                                 
25 Rescheduling refers to an extension in the repayment dates where restructuring is much more 
comprehensive and in addition to an extension in the maturity date of loans may include haircuts, 
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Table 2.5: Panel A 
Estimation Results with Exit from Default as Failure Event  
 
Variables   First Default   Multiple Defaults   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





































Number of loans 
 
0.997    
(0.002) 
0.998   
(0.002) 
0.999   
(0.002) 
0.998    
(0.002)  
0.999    
(0.001) 
0.999    
(0.001) 
0.999    
(0.001) 
0.999   
(0.001) 
      
Collateral     
















Ln (Liquid collateral) 
 
- 







































Ln (Pledged stock) 
 
- 
1.006   
(0.005) 
- 
0.994    
(0.006)  
- 



















Types of collateral 
 
1.022    
(0.017) 




0.994    
(0.030)  
0.983    
(0.013) 






Credit relationships     




























































1.005   
(0.015) 






0.995    
(0.011) 




           
Default variables             


















































































0.996   
(0.004) 










































































 - - 




Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
No. of observations  776,997 776,997 439,764 439,764  931,677 931,677 550,188 550,188 
Log Likelihood  -98,108 -98,311 -62,128 -62,099  -143,672 -143,933 -94,678 -94,647 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df) 29,988 (24)  29,583 (28) 20,321 (25)  20,377 (29)   46,922 (24) 46,399 (28) 34,417 (25)  34,480 (29) 
Note: This Table presents the results of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model with exit from default defined as a ‘failure event’.  Panel A contains estimation results with nominal 
values of independent variables.  In the first four models, the dataset is confined to first default (and exit) only and subsequent defaults are ignored.  In the next four models, all the 
defaults as well as exits are taken into account.  The first model contains the total value of collateral which is substituted with five different types of collateral in second model.  The 
third model adds interest rate as another independent variable in the first model and the fourth model substitutes total collateral with types of collateral.  This sequence is repeated in 
the next four models with multiple defaults.  Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
** significant at 5% level 





Table 2.5: Panel B 
Estimation Results with Exit from Default as Failure Event 
 
Variables   First Default _ Deflated     Multiple Defaults _ Deflated   
    (9) (10) (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15) (16) 





































Number of loans 
  
0.997   
(0.002) 
0.998   
(0.002) 
0.998   
(0.002) 
0.998   
(0.002)   
0.999   
(0.001) 






        
Collateral       










        
Ln (Liquid collateral) 
  - 
0.993   
(0.005) - 
0.983***   
(0.006)   - 




Ln (Residential mortgage) 
  - 
1.019*** 
(0.002) - 
1.005   





Ln (Commercial mortgage) 
  - 
1.016*** 
(0.002) - 
0.998   





Ln (Pledged stock) 
  - 
1.006   
(0.005) - 
0.996   
(0.006)   - 




Ln (Other collateral) 









        
Types of collateral 
  
1.021   
(0.017) 




0.986   
(0.030)   
0.982   
(0.013) 






           
Credit Relationships       




























































1.000   
(0.015) 
0.986   
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Default variables       














































































1.000   
(0.006) 
1.004   




































1.001   



























           
Credit pricing           
Interest rate 









           
Year dummies   Included Included Included Included   Included Included Included Included 
           
No. of observations  776,997 776,997 439,764 439,764  931,677 931,677 550,188 550,188 
Log likelihood  -98,406 -98,613 -62,377 -62,358  -144,237 -144,496 -95,228 -95,208 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)  29,394 (24) 28,979 (28) 19,822 (25) 19,860 (29)  45,790 (24) 45,273 (28) 33,317 (25) 33,359 (29) 
Note: This Table presents the results of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model with exit from default defined as ‘failure event’.  Panel B contains estimation results with deflated values 
of independent variables.  In the first four models (9 to 12), the dataset is confined to first default (and exit) only and subsequent defaults are ignored.  In the next four models (13 to 
16), all the defaults as well as exits are taken into account.  Model 9 contains the total value of collateral which is substituted with five different types of collateral in the model at 
column 10.   Model 11 adds ‘interest rate’ as another independent variable in model 9 and the model at column 12 substitutes total collateral with types of collateral.  This sequence is 
repeated in the next four models (13 to 16) with multiple defaults.  Standard errors are shown in parenthesis. 
** significant at 5% level 






We first look at the variables representing the size of the borrowings. The 
firms having borrowed larger amounts take more time to exit from default. This is 
consistent with the notion that the resolution of large loans is more complicated and 
requires more time. However, the higher propensity of the firms borrowing larger 
sums of money to remain in default longer may also be construed as evidence of 
misuse of system inefficiencies by such borrowers. There have been consistent 
observations and findings regarding judicial system manipulations in Pakistan by 
persons with influence and power.26 A weak judicial system deters the lenders from 
taking defaulting firms to courts and forces them to resolve defaults through private 
negotiations (Claessens et al., 2003). The inability of the lenders to efficiently 
foreclose collateral or liquidate defaulting firms would naturally strengthen the 
bargaining position of the borrower in a default resolution process. 
Higher sanctioned limits, however, expedite the resolution of default. The 
sanctioned credit limits have been found to be associated with firms having higher 
cash flows (Sufi, 2009). In addition, the financial institutions in Pakistan generally 
reserve the right to cancel or revoke, at their own discretion, even a sanctioned 
limit.27 This discretion helps them to contain their exposure in case of a default. The 
banks, however, generally keep the sanctioned limits intact if, in their judgement, the 
default is temporary or if they want the defaulting borrowers to utilize cushion in 
their limits to clear their default. In both scenarios, higher sanctioned limits help the 
borrowers to come out of default. 
The optimal number of credit relationships is an important question for each 
firm. The higher number of creditors, being associated with inefficient reorganization 
in case of default, works as a deterrent against strategic default but also results in 
higher probability of liquidation in case of genuine default (Bolton and Scharfstein, 
                                                 
26 For example, the Ex-Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, Dr. Ishrat Husain, lamented the 
inefficiencies of the judicial system regarding loan recoveries in his essay “Judicial reforms and 
economic growth” published in the Express Tribute (Pakistan) on 17th March 2012. A working paper 
titled “Approaches to Legal and Judicial Reform in Pakistan” dated January 2011 by the Development 
Policy and Research Centre (DPRC) of Lahore University of Management Sciences and Law (LUMS) 
explains the misuse of the judicial system by powerful people (available 
at http://dprc.lums.edu.pk accessed on 25th February 2015). 




1996).28 We estimate the impact of both the number of credit relationships as well as 
number of credit relationships in default on duration of default. Our estimation 
results show that having a higher number of credit relationships helps the firms in 
exiting default quickly. However, default with a higher number of credit 
relationships impedes the resolution process, most probably because of coordination 
problems. In fact, one additional bank relationship in default more than doubles the 
duration of default: this result holds across all models in Table 2.5. The credit 
relationship with multiple financial institution, we presume augment a borrower’s 
ability to either payoff its overdue amounts to a bank by using financing from other 
banks or to use its credit relationships as a source of leverage in negotiation after 
default. 
In addition to credit relationships, we also examined the role of number of 
branches and the number of financing products in the default resolution process. The 
variable ‘number of branches’ captures the number of branches of a bank with which 
a firm conducts credit transactions and represents breadth of a bank-borrower 
relationship. The variable ‘number of products’ represents the number of financing 
services utilized by a firm from a lender. Both the variables are significant and have 
hazard ratios of less than one across all specifications indicating their negative role in 
default resolution. This shows that coordination is not only an issue between 
different lenders in case of default, it is also a problem if a borrower is availing credit 
facilities from multiple branches of the same financial institution or utilizing various 
types of financing products. Having higher numbers of products utilized for 
financing makes the resolution of defaults complicated and thus such borrowers take 
more time in exiting default. 
The variable ‘main bank’ identifies the credit transactions carried out with 
main bank if the borrower has credit relationships with more than one financial 
institution. The variable is significant with a hazard ratio of more than 1, reflecting 
an expeditious default resolution if the loan in default is from the main bank. Our 
results support the findings of Elsas and Krahnen (1998) that main banks are helpful 
for the borrowers in distress. 
                                                 
28 A genuine default is because of cash flow problems of the firm where the firm is unable to honour 
its obligations. A strategic default, on the other hand, is committed to obtain better terms or seek 
partial write offs. 
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Collateral has a hazard ratio of more than one, which means that the firms 
offering higher collateral exit default quickly, ceteris paribus. There are mixed 
findings about the role of collateral in debt renegotiation. Bester (1994) reported that 
collateral facilitates debt restructuring while Neus and Stadler (2013) observe a 
diminishing role of collateral after the loan default. Our findings support the view 
that collateral facilitates default resolution. It implies that despite the issues related 
with foreclosure of collateral in Pakistan, discussed at the start of this section, banks 
still do rely on it to some extent. There is a possibility that, while it is difficult to 
foreclose on collateral because of the inefficient judicial system, collateral may still 
give some bargaining power to the banks in case of default. 
While total collateral is significant across all models in Table 2.5, further 
consideration of the role of types rather than total collateral provides a more nuanced 
view. In our analyses of exit from default, not all types of collateral are statistically 
significant. Mortgages (both residential and commercial) and ‘other collateral’ tend 
to be statistically significant, with hazard ratios of 1.019, 1.015 and 1.033 
respectively. Liquid collateral and pledged stock are not statistically significant: 
these types of collateral do not play any role during the default resolution process. 
Liquid collateral may become immaterial when firms are in default because it may 
have already been used or earmarked by the lender against its claim on the defaulting 
borrower and thus remains no more available at post default stage. The insignificance 
of pledged stock, however, is another matter. Pledged stock cannot be sold off by the 
bank without the help of the legal apparatus of the country. However, pledged stocks 
are moveable items and in many cases perishable as well. Being moveable and on the 
premises of the borrower, there is a high risk of pilferage once the borrower has 
defaulted. As a result, just like liquid collateral, pledged stock loses its importance at 
post default stage. 
The hazard ratio of less than 1 for overdue amounts suggest that severity of 
default increases the duration of default as also observed by Bonfim et al. (2012). 
This is also intuitive since the borrowers will need more time to arrange for the 
repayment of the higher overdue amounts and banks will also take more time in 




The existence of litigation between a lender and a borrower also makes the 
default resolution difficult. In fact, the higher the amount in litigation, the more time 
it takes for the borrower to exit default as suggested by a hazard ration of less than 1 
for the variable ‘amount in litigation’. Write-off is the only variable related to default 
that expedites renegotiation process. A decision to write-off is generally taken by a 
bank as a result of some sort of negotiated settlement. The results show that when the 
banks are ready to accept a write-off, resolution of the problem loans can be achieved 
quickly. 
The interest rate, both nominal and real, is significant and increases the 
duration of default but only when we restrict the analysis to first default only. The 
higher interest rate adversely affects the debt servicing capacity of a borrower who is 
already in distress and as a result exit from default becomes more difficult. Thus a 
reduction in the interest rate may be an appropriate and effective strategy to pull such 
borrowers out of default. The interest rate, however, becomes insignificant when we 
take into account first, as well as, subsequent defaults. It means after the first episode 
of default and its resolution, interest rates no longer remain relevant for subsequent 
defaults. The repetition of default means that either the borrower is in serious trouble 
or is in default by choice. As a result, a reduction in the interest rate is not an 
effective strategy to help or deal with second and subsequent defaults. 
The hazard ratios for ‘Islamic banks’, ranging from 1.257 to 2.069 as shown 
in Table 2.5, demonstrate that Islamic banks are much better than their conventional 
counterparts in resolving default. This could be attributed to borrowers’ preference 
towards Islamic banks for regularization of their loan as Baele et al. (2014) found 
that likelihood of default by the same borrower on an Islamic finance loan is less 
than on a conventional loan. The efficient default resolution, however, may also be a 
result of better information that an Islamic bank acquires about its customers by 
virtue of peculiar characteristics of Islamic financing products that require a closer 
interaction between lender and borrower.29 
 
                                                 
29 The bulk of financing by Islamic banks in Pakistan is done through Murabaha, which is basically a 
sale and purchase transaction between lender and borrower. The nature of transaction enables the 
Islamic banks to get much more information about their borrowers (like for example, their products, 




2.6.2 Re-access to fresh credit 
Access to credit is a lifeline for subsistence as well as necessary precondition for the 
growth of business. It is, therefore, important to assess whether the borrowers who 
default are able to access fresh credit after exiting default and when are they able to 
do so. Further, it is important how the different variables affect the ability of such 
borrowers to access fresh credit. We define access as having obtained a new loan 
after exiting default. It is important to note that, as earlier pointed out in Section 2.1, 
our definition of access to fresh credit is quite strict and we only acknowledge access 
when the firm obtains a new loan.  Thus renewal of an existing facility or drawdown 
under an existing facility would not count as access to fresh credit. 
Figure 2.2 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival function for access to fresh 
credit after exiting default. In this case, the failure event (generic term used in the 
survival analysis) is access to fresh credit after exiting default. The graph shows that 
the majority of the firms are able to access fresh credit after default, although the 
probability declines with time. The first 25% of the firms gain access to fresh credit 
within ten months of the exit from default, whereas 50% of the firms get access to 
fresh credit in about 30 months. 
 
Figure 2.2: Access to Fresh Credit after Exiting Default 
 
Note: Analysis time is the number of months after clearing default.  The survival estimate yields the 
probability of subjects remaining in the same state till time t.  In the current scenario, it is used to 
assess the probability of accessing fresh credit till time t.  The access to fresh credit has been defined 
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As described in Section 2.2, Bonfim et al. (2012) is the only study that has 
examined access to fresh credit after default. Our findings here are different from 
those of Bonfim et al. (2012) who observe that 25% of the firms increase their bank 
debt within two quarters of exiting default. They also observe that firms, which are 
not able to re-access credit within one year of exiting default, have less than 1% 
chance of getting credit afterwards. The differences, however, may be the result of 
different definitions of access to credit. Bonfim et al. (2012) use increase in total 
credit as evidence of obtaining a fresh loan whereas this study, having the benefit of 
a loan level dataset, identifies access to fresh credit only when a new loan has been 
obtained by the firm. 
The results of estimations of time for access to fresh credit as a dependent 
variable are presented in Table 2.6. From Table 2.6, we see that firms with larger 
outstanding principal, higher sanctioned limits and greater number of loans are able 
to access fresh loans earlier after clearing default.30 Bonfim et al. (2012) also observe 
a positive relationship between larger outstanding amounts and access to fresh credit 
after clearing default. Our results suggest that sanctioned loan limits and number of 
loans have the same effect on access to fresh credit as that of the outstanding loan 
amount. 
In the previous section, we discussed that multiple credit relationships help the 
borrower in exiting default. We now observe that this variable is also helpful in 
obtaining fresh loans after default resolution. In fact, firms conducting credit 
transactions with greater number of branches and using multiple financing products 
are also at an advantageous position in accessing fresh credit as implied by the 
hazard ratios of more than one for both these variables in Table 2.6. These results 
suggest that generally larger firms are able to access the loan market faster than 
smaller firms, after resolving default. Our assessment is based on the notion that 
generally large firms would obtain bigger loans, would have relationships with more 
banks and branches, and would use greater number of financing products as 
compared to small firms. 
                                                 
30 Variable ‘number of loans’ has a hazard ratio of 1.001 (which is very close to one, indicating the 
low impact of the variable on dependent variable) and is not significant when we confine the dataset 
to access to fresh credit after first default only, that is, we ignore subsequent defaults and re-access 
after such defaults. However, the variable becomes significant when re-access to fresh credit after 
subsequent defaults is also taken into account and its hazard ratio also improves to 1.004. 
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Table 2.6: Panel A 
Estimation Results with Failure Event as Access to Fresh Credit after Exiting Default 
 
Variables   First Default   Multiple Default 
    (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 





































Number of loans 
  






1.001    









           
Collateral       









(0.005)   
        
Ln (Liquid collateral) 
  
1.006   
(0.006) 
0.998    
(0.008) 
1.009   
(0.005) 
1.006    
(0.006) 




0.996    
(0.005) 
1.001   
(0.003) 
0.997    
(0.004) 




1.005    
(0.004) 
1.005   
(0.003) 
1.003    
(0.004) 




0.987    
(0.007) 
0.996   
(0.005) 
0.994    
(0.006) 








1.006    
(0.004) 








0.954      
(0.035)   
1.005  
(0.016) 




1.018    
(0.025) 
           
Credit Relationships       
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Default variables       




















































1.004    
(0.007) 




































           
Other variables              
Rating (dummy) 
  
















Maturity of loan 
  







(0.001)   
1.000  
(0.000) 




0.999    
(0.001) 
















1.037    
(0.166) 
           
Credit pricing           
Interest rate 
  - - 
0.998  
(0.006) 
0.998    
(0.006)   - - 
1.000  
(0.005) 
1.001    
(0.005) 
           
Year dummies   Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
           
No. of observations  88,454 88,454 59,821 59,821  166,453 166,453 114,524 114,524 
Log likelihood  -33,780 -33,750 -22,062 -22,055  -46,000 -45,986 -30,657 -30,654 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)  3,240 (24) 3,300 (28) 2,235 (25) 2,249 (29)  2,342 (24) 2,370 (28) 1,691 (25) 1,696 (29) 
Note: This Table presents the results of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model with access to credit after clearing default defined as ‘failure event’.  Panel A contains estimation results 
with nominal values of independent variables.  In the first four models, the dataset is confined to first default (exit and subsequent access to credit) only and subsequent defaults are 
ignored.  In the next four models, all the defaults (as well as exits and access to credit) are taken into account.  The first model contains the total value of collateral which is 
substituted with five different types of collateral in the second model.   The model at column 3 adds ‘interest rate’ as another independent variable in model 1 and the model at 
column 4 substitutes total collateral with types of collateral.  This sequence is repeated in the next four models (5 to 8) with multiple defaults.  Standard errors are shown in 
parenthesis.  
** significant at 5% level 









Table 2.6: Panel B 
Estimation Results with Failure Event as Access to Fresh Credit after Exiting Default 
 
Variables   First Default _ Deflated     Multiple Defaults _ Deflated   
    (9) (10) (11) (12)   (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 
Size of the Borrowing     
































Number of loans 
  




1.001    
(0.002) 
1.001     









      
Collateral     
Ln (Total collateral) 1.014*** 
(0.005) 
1.012    
(0.006)   
1.010** 
(0.005) 
1.006    
(0.005)   
      
Ln (Liquid collateral) 1.005  
(0.006) 






Ln (Residential mortgage) 1.003  
(0.004) 






Ln (Commercial mortgage) 1.010*** 
(0.003) 






Ln (Pledged stock) 0.996  
(0.006) 














      








0.959     
(0.035)   








           
Credit Relationships     




































































           
 
Default variables     


















































































           
Other variables             
Rating (dummy) 
 




0.937    
(0.046) 
0.942     
(0.047)  








Maturity of loan 
  







(0.001)   






















1.036    
(0.166) 
1.034    
(0.166) 
           
Credit pricing           
Interest rate   
- - 
0.999    
(0.006) 
0.999  
 (0.006)   - - 
1.003 
  (0.005) 
1.003  
(0.005) 
           
Year dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
           
No. of observations  88,454 88,454 59,821 59,821  166,453 166,453 114,524 114,524 
Log likelihood  -33,780 -33,751 -22,066 -22,058  -46,000 -45,986 -30,658 -30,655 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (df)  3,239 (24) 3,299 (28) 2,228 (25) 2,243 (29)  2,343 (24) 2,371 (28) 1,689 (25) 1,695 (29) 
Note: This Table presents the results of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model with access to credit after clearing default defined as ‘failure event’.  Panel B contains estimation results 
with deflated values of independent variables.  In the first four models (at columns 9 to 12), the dataset is confined to first default (exit and subsequent access to credit) only and 
subsequent defaults are ignored.  In the next four models (at columns 13 to 16), all the defaults (as well as exits and access to credit) are taken into account.  The first model at 
column 9 contains the total value of collateral which is substituted with five different types of collateral in the next model at column 10.   The model at column 11 adds ‘interest rate’ 
as another independent variable in model 9 and the next model at column 12 substitutes total collateral with types of collateral.  This sequence is repeated in the next four models (13 
to 16) with multiple defaults.  Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.  
** significant at 5% level 






The variable ‘main bank’ is significant across all models in Table 2.6, with 
hazard ratios ranging from 1.167 to 1.319. This variable identifies the credit 
transaction of a firm with its main bank in the dataset. The results show that the firms 
clearing default with their main bank are able to access credit markets faster. Our 
results in the previous section show an efficient default resolution if the loan has 
been obtained from the main bank of the borrowers. These findings suggest that 
relationship with main bank is welfare enhancing both in terms of efficient default 
resolution and access to credit markets after clearing default. 
The value of collateral also plays a positive role as suggested by its hazard 
ratios of more than one in Table 2.6 across all specification. Thus higher the 
collateral a borrower has, the quicker it will be able to access the fresh credit. While 
there is a plausible economic justification for this phenomenon (banks would be 
more willing to lend if borrower can offer suitable collateral), this relationship may 
also be the manifestation of influence of the large firms. Generally large firms would 
have access to higher levels of collateral. However, given the issues related with 
foreclosure of collateral because of an inefficient judicial system, financial 
institutions are generally not expected to assign substantial weightage to collateral 
especially when they are lending to a firm with bad credit history. A positive 
relationship between collateral and access to fresh credit after default, therefore, may 
actually be driven by the influence wielded by large firms in Pakistan. 
Bonfim et al. (2012) observe that overdue amounts increase the time to 
access fresh credit. We also find that larger overdue amounts make access to fresh 
credit difficult even after the resolution of default. The larger overdue amounts may 
be a reflection of deterioration in the financial condition of the firm. In such a case, 
lenders would generally be unwilling to take fresh stake in the company because of 
higher credit risk. The greater forced sale value of collateral and amount in litigation 
also stretches the timeframe to obtain fresh loans, presumably because of the same 
reasons discussed in Section 2.6.1 in detail. 
The ‘write off’, which facilitates the borrowers in exiting default quickly, has 
an adverse impact on access to credit as shown by its hazard ratios of less than one 
across all specification in Table 2.6. It means that even when the banks support the 
borrowers in exiting default through write offs, such write offs create a hindrance for 
borrowers in re-accessing fresh credit. This creates a major dilemma. The absence of 
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fresh credit, post default, may not only constrain the growth prospects of a company 
but may endanger its very existence, thus compromising the very objective for which 
write off was offered by the bank. 
The borrowers of the Islamic banks are able to access fresh credit faster as 
compared to borrowers of conventional financial institutions. This may be 
attributable to a more accommodative stance that Islamic banks can take because of 
their access to higher information about the borrower as Sol (2009) find that more 
information about the borrowers during default plays an important role in 
lenders’ decision to extend fresh loans to defaulters.31 
The interest rate is insignificant across all model specifications in Table 2.6, 
suggesting that it does not play any role in access to fresh credit after default 
resolution. A borrower with a poor credit history will be considered a higher risk by 
the lenders. One may suggest that lenders could compensate for this risk through 
charging higher interest rates to such borrowers. In such a scenario, interest rate 
should be significant with an hazard ratio of more than one. However, our results 
support the argument of Stiglitz and Wejss (1983) who suggest that lenders would 
not extend fresh credit to defaulters even at the higher interest rates to avoid adverse 
selection. 
 
2.6.3 Joint dynamics of default resolution and access to fresh credit after exiting 
default 
Table 2.7 summarizes the estimation results (reported in Tables 2.5 and 2.6) of 
default resolution and access to credit taking into account the whole credit history of 
the borrowers for comparison purposes. 
 
 
                                                 
31 We have earlier explained, in Section 2.6.1, that peculiar characteristics of Islamic financing 




Summary of the Results 
 
Failure Event  Exit from Default  Access to Credit after Exiting Default 
  Table 2.5, panel 
A, column 5 
Table 2.5, panel 
A, column 7 
 Table 2.6, panel A, 
column 5 
Table 2.6, panel A, 
column 7 
Size of the Borrower       
Ln (Principal)  - -  + + 
Ln (Limit)  + +  + + 
Number of loans  n/s n/s  + + 
       
Collateral       
Ln (Total collateral)  + +  + n/s 
Types of collateral  n/s -  n/s n/s 
       
Credit Relationships       
Number of banks  + +  + + 
Number of branches  - -  + + 
Main bank (dummy)  + +  + + 
Number of products  - n/s  + + 
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Other Variables       
Rating (dummy)  + +  n/s - 
Maturity of loan  + +  n/s n/s 
Islamic bank (dummy)  + +  + + 
       
Default Variables       
Ln (Total overdues)  - -  - - 
Ln (Write offs)  + +  - - 
Number of bank relationships in default  - -  n/s n/s 
Ln (FSV of collateral)  - -  - - 
Ln (Amount in litigation)  - -  - - 
       
       
Credit Pricing       
Interest rate  n/a n/s  n/a n/s 
       
Year dummies  Included Included  Included Included 
Note: This Table presents a comparison of the estimation results with the two failure events examined in the paper i.e., exit from default and access to credit after clearing default.  
The Table shows the estimation results of the column 5, which take into account all defaults (that is first default as well as subsequent defaults) and the column 7 which adds ‘interest 
rate’ as another independent variable in column 5. The sign (+) denotes a positive and significant association at 1% and 5% level and (-) denotes a negative and significant association 







We find that the firms with smaller loan size are able to resolve default 
quickly. Despite this, such firms take more time in accessing fresh credit after 
clearing default. Further, the access becomes more challenging if these firms do not 
have sanctioned loan limits or the limits are small. Assuming a strong correlation 
between the firm size and size of its borrowing and sanctioned loan limit, our 
interpretation of the results suggests that defaults are especially costly for smaller 
firms in terms of their access to credit markets. Given the fact that small businesses 
play a pivotal role in economic development and generation of employment, policy 
makers may need to extend some handholding to small businesses at the post default 
stage. 
Firms with higher overdue amounts face difficulties both in exiting default 
and in accessing fresh credit after default resolution. The overdue amount would 
generally increase with time in default as firms increasingly do not make payments 
on due dates. Litigation is also a time consuming process and delays both the default 
resolution as well as access to fresh credit. It is, therefore, in the interest of both the 
lender and the borrower to resolve defaults quickly without involving courts. 
Surprisingly, write offs expedite the default resolution process, however, 
borrowers with a write off history face problems in getting fresh credit after exiting 
default. Firms accepting write offs should, therefore, be cautious that this temporary 
relief may compromise their fund raising ability in future. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we use a unique and exhaustive dataset of loans from Pakistan to 
examine the factors that facilitate or hamper loan default resolution and access to 
fresh credit by firms after exiting default. The findings of the study have important 
implications for banks, firms, policy makers and especially bank supervisors. 
We offer the first study that examines the role of collateral and credit pricing 
on default resolution and access to fresh credit. We find that collateral facilitates the 
borrowers in both exiting default and accessing fresh credit after default resolution. 






advantageous position. The firms paying higher interest rates find it difficult to exit 
from default. This suggests that banks should carefully weigh the pros and cons of 
charging high penalty interest rates to their borrowers in default since it can actually 
delay the resolution and hurt both banks and their borrowers. 
We also examine the impact of relationships on default resolution and access 
to fresh credit. Having multiple credit relationships is helpful in resolving default and 
in accessing the credit markets for fresh loans after clearing default. However, in the 
event of default involving more than one credit relationship, both resolution and 
access to credit in the future becomes problematic. We believe that this could be 
because of coordination issues between lenders. Since the delays in default resolution 
and access to credit markets can result in suboptimal utilization of productive 
resources, these findings highlight the need for a suitable mechanism to facilitate 
coordination between lenders at the post default stage. Such a mechanism would be 
useful, not only in resolving defaults involving multiple lenders, but also in arranging 
the necessary funding to keep such borrowers afloat. 
Our findings also suggest that effective coordination is also an issue even 
when a firm borrows from multiple branches of the same financial institution. It may 
be necessary for a firm, especially if it is geographically dispersed, to build credit 
relationships with many branches. However, utilizing facilities from a higher number 
of bank branches, and use of multiple financing products, make the default resolution 
process complicated and time consuming. A centralized default resolution 
mechanism at the banks could iron out these complications and accelerate the 
process, benefitting both the banks and their borrowers. Both of these variables 
(number of both branches and financing products) are, however, helpful to firms at 
the post default stage of accessing fresh credit since accessibility to a higher number 
of bank branches and multiple financing products increase the number of options that 
a borrower can tap into to arrange fresh loans. 
Our results suggest that Islamic banks are able to resolve loan defaults 
quickly as compared to conventional financial institutions. Further, firms dealing 
with Islamic banks are also able to access fresh credit more easily. This shows that 






of information, we cannot say at this stage with certainty whether these findings are 
the results of characteristics of the borrowers of Islamic banks or the business model 
of such financial institutions that requires closer interaction between lender and 




RELATION LENDING: A SOURCE OF SUPPORT OR A MEANS OF 





Relationship lending is characterized by a long term bilateral relationship between a 
lender and borrower. Over this time, the lender collects private information about the 
borrower affording it a competitive advantage over other financial institutions 
(Haubrich, 1989). Relationship lending plays a vital role for financial intermediation 
in opaque environments such as developing economies. Acute information 
asymmetry and poor collateral enforcement are well known features of these 
economies (Hainz, 2003). In contrast, relationship lending has declined in developed 
economies because of greater availability of good quality hard information about 
firms, well developed capital markets and prevalence of alternative financing 
products (Allen and Santomero, 2001; Boot and Thakor, 2000). 
We utilize a unique dataset of each and every loan extended by financial 
institutions to firms in Pakistan during April 2006 to December 2013 to study 
relationship lending.  Previous studies of relationship lending have been hampered 
by data limitations; they have been limited to either certain types of financial 
institutions or borrowers, or both. Our first contribution to the literature on 
relationship lending is that consideration of the type of the lender and the borrower 
has a material influence on the inferences which may be drawn regarding 
relationship lending. To be precise, we explore variations between banks and non-
bank financial institutions (NBFI), foreign banks and domestic financial institutions, 
government financial institutions and private lenders and lastly large banks and small 
and medium size financial institutions. The literature, as we explain in section 3.2, 
has so far only examined the variation between small and large banks regarding 
relationship lending. These potentially limited examinations have resulted in 
conflicting empirical results. Kysucky and Norden (2015) analyse 101 studies on 
relationship lending and propose that differences in empirical findings are caused by
                                                 
* This Chapter of the Thesis was presented at the Asian Finance Conference 2016 in Bangkok, 
AFAANZ conference 2016 in Gold Coast and Financial Markets and Corporate Governance 
conference 2016 in Melbourne. 
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country effects. Our findings, however, suggest that the conflicting empirical 
evidence presented in previous studies may be the result of limited datasets. 
Our detailed results demonstrate that consideration of lender and borrower 
types result in different inferences regarding relationship lending. For example, 
longer lending relationships with NBFIs are better for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) than longer relationships with banks: NBFIs charge lower risk premiums and 
require less collateral as relationship lengths increase.33 Public sector financial 
institutions reduce their credit pricing for SMEs as relationships become longer 
without any impact on collateral.34 SMEs, however, have to post higher collateral to 
obtain loans from private financial institutions and large banks as relationship length 
increases. SMEs are able to obtain loans with less collateral if they concentrate their 
borrowings with one lender but banks exploit this reliance by charging higher 
interest rate in this situation. 
Listed companies dealing with large banks benefit from both lower interest 
rates and less collateral as length of their relationships increase. Public sector banks 
and domestic financial institutions reduce the collateral they require from listed 
companies as relationships lengthen without any effect on credit pricing.  In contrast, 
private sector financial institutions and foreign banks reduce interest rates as the 
relationship length increases but do not lower collateral requirements. Small and 
medium financial institutions are only financial institutions that charge higher risk 
premium on loans to listed firms as the length of their relationship increases. Listed 
firms are able to get relief both in credit pricing and collateral if they concentrate 
their borrowings with one lender. 
Longer lending relationships are generally exploitative for Government firms: 
small and medium financial institutions charge higher risk premium and require more 
collateral as relationship length increases whereas private banks and domestic 
financial institutions increase their credit pricing without any impact on collateral. 
While concentration of credit with one lender helps the Government firms to obtain 
                                                 
33 NBFIs are non-bank financial institutions and include investment banks, leasing companies, 
housing finance companies, development finance institutions and asset management companies. 
34 An SME has been defined in Prudential Regulations issued by the SBP as an entity with annual 
sales turnover of less than Pak Rupees 400 million and with employees less than 50 (for trading 
business) and less than 250 (for manufacturing and services industries). The definition can be 






loan with lower collateral across all type of banks, public sector financial institutions 
exploit this reliance and charge higher interest rates from Government firms in this 
situation.    
The results of our estimations using random coefficient model, when we 
allow the coefficient of relationship length change between firms, show substantial 
influence of heterogeneity between firms on the way the relationship length impacts 
both the collateral levels and risk premiums. The coefficients of relationship length 
between firms vary substantially implying that firm characteristics play a critical role 
on the impact of relationship between firm and its lender.  
The primary contribution of the study is to provide a rationale for conflicting 
empirical findings related to relationship lending. Our analysis suggests that the 
impact of relationship lending varies by type of lender and borrower. In addition to 
demonstrating the sensitivity of inferences regarding relationship lending to lender 
and borrower type, we also make two further contributions to the literature on 
relationship lending. Our second contribution is to be the first study, to our 
knowledge, to examine the impact of relationship lending on credit pricing and 
collateral in a developing country context. Finally, we also supplement our analysis 
with separate estimations for SMEs, listed companies and Government firms. This is 
the first study, to the best of our knowledge, which examines lending relationship 
impact for Government firms. The structure of the remainder of this paper is as 
follows. In section 3.2, we discuss the differences in findings of extant literature on 
relationship lending. In section 3.3, we describe the dataset.  Our estimation 
methodology is discussed in section 3.4. We present our results in section 3.5 and 
section 3.6 concludes the discussion. 
 
3.2 Literature 
Theoretical and empirical research on relationship lending present diverse and, at 
times, conflicting results. One strand of literature posits that a durable relationship 
with a financial institution is welfare enhancing for borrowers and results in lower 






advantage with the borrower. The other strand of literature asserts that lenders 
exploit their informational advantage and extract rents from their borrowers by 
imposing higher credit pricing and collateral requirements. Boot (2000) and 
Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004) provide reviews of relevant literature and Kysucky 
and Nordon (2015) discuss the tensions in empirical findings on the subject. 
 The strength of any bank-borrower lending relationship(s) is 
multidimensional and can be assessed in a number of ways. The most common 
measure used in the literature is duration or length of the lending relationship 
followed by scope (use of multiple products of lender) and reliance of the firm on a 
particular lender in terms of its share in total financing of the firm. 
In an early empirical study, Petersen and Rajan (1994) found that length of 
the bank-borrower relationship does not have any impact on interest rate. Similar 
conclusions have been reached in a number of other studies (Elsas and Krahnen, 
1998; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001; Machauer and Weber,1998) discarding any 
linkage between length of relationship and credit pricing. However, Blackwell and 
Winters (1997), Brick and Palia (2007) and Peltoniemi (2007) find that firms with 
longer relationships are charged lower interest rates.   
Harhoff and Körting (1998) find no relationship between relation length and 
the interest rate, but observe lower collateral with the increase in relationship length.  
Chakraborty and Hu (2006) also observe that collateral requirements decline with the 
increase in duration of bank-borrower relationship. Degryse and Van Cayseele 
(2000) and Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano (2010) find that firms with 
longer relationships with banks pay higher interest rates, however, length of 
relationship does not affect collateral requirements.  This is also found by Steijvers et 
al. (2010). Ono and Uesugi (2009), however, observe higher collateral requirements 
for customers with longer relationships with banks.  Berger and Udell (1995), 
Bodenhorn (2003) and Bharath et al. (2011) observe that both interest rate and 
collateral requirements drop as duration of bank-borrower relationship increases. 
 Relying on one lender to meet the bulk of its credit needs reduces a firm’s 






from a bank also results in lower interest rates (Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000). 
Multiple lending relationships reduce the value of the private information collected 
by a particular bank (Cole, 1998) and borrowing from multiple lenders results in 
higher interest rates (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and heavier collateral requirements 
(Harhoff and Körting, 1998). However, Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano 
(2010) find that firms maintaining more than one banking relationship get cheaper 
credit 
 Regarding the impact of the type of lender, research has mainly concentrated 
on the differences between small and large banks. Small banks are found to be in a 
better position to use soft information collected through relationship lending and also 
to make effective use of it (Berger and Black, 2011; Berger et al., 2005). Uchida et 
al. (2012) find that small banks focus on relationship lending whereas large banks 
concentrate on transaction lending.35 While Shimizu (2012) and Mudd (2013) find 
that small banks concentrate on small firms for relationship lending. Stanton (2002) 
observes, however, that relationship lending is more suitable for large loans since it 
requires substantial time and effort from lending officers.  Berger and Black (2011) 
also observe that comparative advantage of small banks in relationship lending is 
optimum when lending to large firms. Longer relationships with small banks result in 
lower interest rates while having an opposite effect of higher interest rates in case of 
relationships with large banks (Kano et al., 2011). Bharath et al. (2011) observe that 
relationship loans and transaction loans, in terms of cost of credit, becomes 
indistinguishable for large firms. 
 A few studies have examined the impact of relationship length on the quality 
of the lender’s portfolio and probability of default. Jiménez and Saurina (2004) find 
that close bank-borrower relationships induce banks to assume more credit risk 
whereas Kang et al. (2013) find that relationship lenders increase banks’ 
commitments to bad loans exposing themselves to higher credit losses. Fiordelisi et 
al. (2014) observe that long bank-borrower relationship reduces the probability that a 
firm would become distressed. 
                                                 
35 Transaction lending is the form of lending based on the use of publicly available hard information 






3.3 The Data 
We use an exhaustive dataset of business loans from Pakistan covering the period 
April 2006 to December 2013. The dataset has been obtained from the Credit 
Information Bureau (CIB) of the Central Bank of Pakistan.36 All financial institutions 
in Pakistan are legally obliged to report all credit transaction to CIB and thus the 
dataset covers every loan granted by a financial institution to a firm in Pakistan. April 
2006 was chosen as the starting point because major changes were introduced in 
reporting formats by the CIB from this date.  Incorporation of data prior to this 
period is problematic because of changes in codes and definitions. 
The original dataset is a month-wise loan-level dataset containing information 
about loans as well as non-fund based facilities (such as bank guarantees and letters 
of credit) obtained by a firm.37 A loan in itself is, however, a transitory phenomenon 
as it is obtained and then repaid and a new loan is generated. We, therefore, collapse 
the loan data to the level of bank-borrower and thus our unit of observation becomes 
bank-borrower-month. Our final dataset contains about 1.66 million observations 
pertaining to nearly 41,000 firms.38  
Table 3.1 contains the list of variables used in the analysis. We measure 
strength of the bank-borrower relationship in multiple dimensions. Kysucky and 
Norden (2015) identify four key dimensions to assess the strength of bank-borrower 
relationship in literature: length or duration of the relationship, concentration of 
                                                 
36 The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is the central bank of Pakistan as well as the banking sector 
regulator.  It operates a credit information bureau (CIB) under section 25A of the Banking Companies 
Ordinance, 1962.  All financial institutions in Pakistan are mandated to submit information about their 
credit transaction to CIB on a monthly basis.  The CIB’s database, therefore, covers all credit 
transactions taking place in the whole economy of Pakistan. 
37 The dataset has been obtained from the Credit Information Bureau (CIB) of the State Bank of 
Pakistan.  The SBP checks the accuracy of data submitted by financial institutions during their 
periodical inspections and imposes penalties for misreporting.  Further, financial institutions also use 
this data for credit decisions and hence it is in their own interest to ensure the quality of data.  A 
number of published studies (see for example Khwaja and Mian (2005), Khwaja et al. (2010) and 
Baele et al. (2014)) have used this data and assessed the quality of data being quite good. 
38 The firms that pay off their entire financing facilities drop off from the dataset although their 
historical records are still maintained.  Since the study assesses the impact of relationship lending on 
firms that are borrowing from the financial sector, this aspect should not affect the analysis.  The CIB 
assigns a unique borrower code to each borrower and this borrower code remains the same 
irrespective of change of name.  The dataset does not contain information whether a firm is member of 
a group of companies or not.  Resultantly subsidiaries of firms are also treated separately.  I, however, 






borrowings by a firm from a lender, distance between firm and bank and range of 
financial services obtained by the firm from its lender.  Most studies, as we have 
noted above, have used length of the lending relationship to represent bank-borrower 
relationship strength. In addition to the relationship length, we use four other 
variables. The lender’s share in financing of the firm is used to assess borrower 
reliance on one lender or degree of its concentration of borrowings. Number of loans, 
number of financing products obtained from the bank and existence of non-fund 
based facility like bank guarantees, letters of credit, etc. capture the scope of bank-
borrower relationship or cross-product synergies. 
The study examines the impact of the bank-borrower relationship on 
collateral requirement and interest rate. There is clearly a positive relationship 
between the size of the collateral and the size of the loan. We, however, are 
interested in assessing whether the same size of loan would elicit differential 
collateral requirements dependent on the relationship length. We, therefore, scaled 
collateral by the sanctioned loan limit to neutralize this impact.  
In addition to relationship aspect, the bank’s decision to grant a loan also 
depends upon financial position of the borrower and collateral on offer (Uchida, 
2011). While we do not have access to information on firms’ balance sheets, we 
capture the risk of the firm through its detailed credit history using four variables.  
Overdues show the overdue amounts not paid within due dates by the firm.  Default 
is a dummy variable that captures the quality of the credit as reported by the financial 
institution.39 If the loan is not overdue and the bank is satisfied with the repayment 
capacity of the borrower, it is reported as ‘regular’ by the lender. If it is a problem 
loan, it is reported in one of four categories of classification: OAEM (other assets 
especially mentioned); substandard; doubtful and loss. A dummy variable, default, 
assigns a value of one if a borrower has been reported in any category of 
classification by the bank.  
                                                 
39 The SBP has issued detailed instructions on how to classify loans in its prudential regulations.  The 
instructions are largely objective and a business loan is required to be classified if it becomes overdue 
by 90 days or more.  The category of classification further deteriorates as the number of days overdue 
increases.  Given that all financial institutions under the SBP regulatory domain are required to follow 
these prudential regulations, we can safely assume uniformity of practice for classification of loans in 








Variables and their Descriptions 
 
No. Name of the variable Description 
   
 Relationship Strength Variables  
1. Relationship length (years) Number of years a lender and borrower have 
been in lending relationship 
 
2. Number of loans Number of loans availed by the borrower from 
a particular financial institution 
 
3. Number of financing products Number of types of financing products (like 
term loan, running finance, TFC, bonds, etc.)  
availed by a borrower from a particular lender 
 
4. Lender’s share in financing A particular lender’s share in total financing of 
a borrower from the financial sector. It is 
worked out by dividing financing availed from 
a lender by total financing availed by a 
borrower from all its lenders. 
 
5. Non-fund based facility A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a 
financial institution has granted non-fund 
based facilities like letter of credit, bank 
guaranty, etc. to a borrower in addition to 
loans 
 
   
 Dependent Variables  
6. Collateral The value of the total collateral divided by the 
loan limit sanctioned by a lender to the 
borrower 
 
7. Risk Premium Risk premium (interest rate less risk free rate) 
being charged by the financial institution on 
its loans to a particular borrower 
 
   
 Loan Characteristics  
8. Maturity Maturity of loan extended to borrower by the 
financial institution 
 
9. Principal Principal outstanding amount of the loan 
payable by the borrower 
 
   
 Borrower Characteristics  
10. Number of bank relationships Number of financial institutions with which a 
borrower has lending relationships 
 






borrower is rated either externally or internally 
by the lender
   
12. SME firm A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm 
is an SME, 0 otherwise 
 
13. Listed firm A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm 
is a listed company, 0 otherwise 
 
14. Govt. firm A dummy variable if a firm is majority owned 
and controlled by Government, 0 otherwise
   
 Credit History of Borrower  
15. Overdues Total overdue amount including principal, 
interest or any other amount owed to the 
lender and not paid by the due date 
 
16 Default A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm 
has defaulted on its loan to any of its lender, 0 
otherwise 
 
17. Litigation A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm 
is in litigation regarding recovery of loan with 
its lender, 0 otherwise 
 
18. Write-off A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm 
has availed any sort of write off from its 
lender
   
 Type of Financial Institution  
19. NBFI A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
financial institution is a non-bank financial 
institution like investment bank, leasing 
company, housing finance company, etc. 
 
20. Foreign bank A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
financial institution is a foreign bank 
 
21. Large bank A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
financial institution is large bank 
 
22. Government financial institution A dummy variable with a value of 1 if 
financial institution is Government owned and 
controlled
Note: This Table presents definitions of the variables used in analyses.  The independent variables have been 
grouped into four categories:  relationship strength variables, borrower characteristics, credit history of the 












Two other dummy variables, litigation and write off, identify the borrower if 
it has entered into litigation with its lender or has benefitted from any write off on its 
loans. We use various borrower characteristics as well as types of financial 
institutions as control variables. Three dummy variables, SME firm, Listed firm and 
Govt. firm, are used to identify if a borrower is an SME, listed company or a 
government owned (majority shareholding) and controlled firm. We identify a firm 
as Govt. firm if the Government is the majority shareholder (more than 51% of the 
shares) and the Government has the right to appoint the Chief Executive Officer of 
the firm and majority of the board members. The size of the loan (principal) and 
number of bank relationships represent the size of the borrowings and firm’s access 
to the financial sector. The rating of the borrower is used as a dummy variable to 
assess the impact of information asymmetry.   
The type of financial institution is captured by identifying if a lending 
institution is an NBFI (Non-bank financial institution), a foreign bank, a large bank 
or a Government financial institution. Large banks represent five largest banks in 
Pakistan in terms of size of assets and branch network. Government financial 
institutions have been identified using the same criteria of ownership and control as 
we used for Government firms. 
 Table 3.2 provides summary descriptive statistics of variables (excluding 
dummies) examined in this study. The average relationship length of a firm with a 
financial institution is about 5.45 years with a median of 4.11 years. Since 
relationship length is the most important variable to capture the relationship strength, 
we examine this aspect in more detail. 
     Table 3.3 details the relationship length across different types of lenders and 
firms. The customers of NBFIs have relatively shorter average relationship length at 
4.53 years as compared to those of banks at 5.75 years. The longest average 
relationship period of 6.83 years pertains to Government financial institutions while 
the foreign banks offer the shortest average relationship period of 4.41 years, even 






The relationship length in a particular type of financial institution, however, 
cannot solely be ascribed to the lender.  There is a possibility, for example, that the 
firms prize their relationship with Government banks and maintain it at the expense 
of their relationship with other banks, perhaps owing to the perception that this will 
result in better loan terms and conditions.  Ongena and Smith (2001) find that firms 
in Norway maintain the longest relationships with two largest banks of the country.  
Regarding type of borrower, listed firms have substantially longer relationships, 
averaging 6.32 years compared to 4.77 years for SMEs.  Government firms lag 
slightly behind listed firms with average relationship length of 5.9 years.  
Table 3.2: 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Excluding Dummies 
 
(Amounts are in Pakistan Rupees Millions) 
Name of Variables Mean Std. Dev. Percentiles 
p_10* p_25* p_50* p_75* p_90* 
Relationship Strength Variables
Relationship length (years) 5.45 4.91 1.13 2.22 4.11 6.93 11.04
Number of loans 2.38 3.62 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 5.00
Number of financing products 1.56 1.14 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00
Lender's share in financing 0.76 0.36 0.10 0.46 1.00 1.00 1.00
Dependent Variables 
Collateral 1.68 1.58 0.42 0.99 1.00 2.00 3.72
Interest rate 14.74 3.84 10.19 12.63 14.98 17.00 19.13
Loan characteristics   
Maturity 3.14 2.79 0.58 1.00 2.91 4.33 6.25
Principal 47.00 150.00 0.11 0.69 3.50 20.00 100.00
Borrower Characteristics   
Number of bank relationships 3.26 4.47 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.00 8.00
Credit history of the borrower   
Overdues 6.20 40.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.30
Note: This Table presents descriptive statistics for variables (excluding dummies) used in estimations in the paper 
*  The terms p_10, p_25, p_50, p_75 and p_90  represent values at 10th percentile, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, 




Relationship Length (in years) Segmented by Types of Financial Institution and Borrower 
No. of observations Mean St. dev. Percentiles 
p_10* p_25* p_50* p_75* p_90* 
Financial Institution Type 
NBFIsa                         403,216  4.53 4.10 0.94 1.93 3.43 5.77 8.87 
Banks                      1,257,909  5.75 5.11 1.19 2.34 4.36 7.28 11.84 
Govt. financial institutions                         275,046  6.83 6.45 1.11 2.38 4.76 8.25 17.64 
Private financial institutions                      1,386,079  5.18 4.50 1.13 2.19 4.00 6.72 10.18 
Foreign banks                         107,211  4.41 3.40 1.13 2.12 3.61 5.70 8.41 
Domestic financial institution                      1,553,914  5.52 4.99 1.13 2.23 4.16 7.02 11.28 
Large banks                         556,593  6.40 6.01 1.20 2.33 4.59 7.89 14.53 
Small and medium financial 
institutions                      1,104,532  4.97 4.17 1.09 2.17 3.92 6.45 9.76 
Borrower type 
SMEs                         355,945  4.77 4.12 1.06 2.01 3.70 6.33 9.10 
Listed firms                         121,396  6.32 5.06 1.41 2.76 5.05 8.19 13.09 
Govt. firms                           12,636  5.90 6.01 0.92 1.99 4.05 7.09 14.01 
Note: This Table provides relationship length statistics by different type of financial institutions and borrowers. 
a NBFIs are non-bank financial institutions and include investment banks, leasing companies, housing finance companies, development finance institutions and asset 
management companies 
* The terms p_10, p_25, p_50, p_75 and p_90 represent values at 10th percentile, 25th percentile, 50th percentile, 75th percentile and 90th percentile respectively.
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The average number of loans availed by a firm from a lender is 2.38.  
However, about 56% of the observations in the dataset pertain to bank-borrower 
relationships with only one loan. Average number of products used by firms to raise 
financing is 1.56 while a lender’s share in a firm total financing is averaged at about 
76%. However, in about 63% of the observations, one lender is sole provider of the 
funds of a firm. These figures show a general trend of reliance of firms on one lender 
for their financing needs. 
The average collateral ratio (collateral value/sanctioned loan limit) in our 
dataset is 1.68. However, there is substantial variation with lowest 10 percentile of 
the observations falling below 0.42 and largest 10 percentile of the observations with 
collateral ratio higher than 3.72. Interest rate has a mean of 14.74 and maturity of the 
loans averages at about 3.14 years. 
The mean overdue amount is PKR 6.2 million. About 23% of the 
observations in our dataset have overdue status, which is a substantial number.  
However, this perhaps reflects that financial sector of Pakistan was under stress 
during the period under our examination. NPLs of the banking system started 
increasing after December 2006 from 6.89% and rose to 15.74% by December 2011 
after which they gradually declined to 12.99% by December 2013.40  
 
3.4 Estimation Methodology 
The dataset is an unbalanced panel and our dependent variables are collateral ratio 
and risk premium. The collateral ratio has been obtained by dividing the amount of 
the collateral by the sanctioned loan limit and risk premium has been obtained by 
subtracting risk free rate from interest rate.41 In addition, we use GDP deflator to 
convert nominal value of principal and overdue amounts into real value.   
One of the dependent variables – collateral - is bounded by zero as the lower 
limit. Wooldridge (2011) terms such variables as “corner solution response(s)” and 
argues that standard censored regression model is suitable for such distributions.  
                                                 
40 Financial sector reviews (BSRs) of the SBP for the relative periods are available at 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/FSR/index.htm. 
41 For risk free rate, we use rate of return on Government 3 months treasury bills obtained from 






Accordingly, we, employ maximum likelihood to estimate the following random 
effects panel Tobit model.   
Y*it = Xit  + εit+ μi 
Y* is a latent variable, observable for values greater than zero and censored 
otherwise and X is a vector of independent variables. μi is the unit specific error term 
and for a specific unit, its value is constant. εit is the observations specific error term. 
The second dependent variable, risk premium has both the negative and 
positive values. We use a multivariate GLS regression with setting to fit the 
following random effects panel model. 
Y*it =  + Xit  + εit+ νi 
We use random effects for both types of estimations since differences across 
borrowers can influence our dependent variables and random effects enables us to 
assess the impact of type of borrowers on collateral and risk premium. This 
approach, however, assumes that observed variables are not correlated with the 
unobserved variables – a strong assumption that may not be valid. The key 
assumption that independent variables are uncorrelated with unobserved effects is 
critical to establish consistency.  The violation of this assumption will imply that one 
or more of the explanatory variables is correlated with error term and may result in 
estimators being both biased and inconsistent.  This bias does not disappear even in 
large sample, as is the case in this study.  The direction of the bias would depend on 
the sign of correlation between explanatory variables included in the regression and 
omitted variables, which is not known thus making interpretation of the results 
inconclusive in the presence of this bias. In order to address this issue, we employ a 
Mundlak correction that enables us to relax this assumption by adding group means 
of exogenous variables in our models (Mundlak, 1978).  
Since the amount of the loan and its terms and conditions (interest rate, 
collateral and maturity) are generally decided upon simultaneously, endogeneity may 






variable, take collateral, we first estimate the model without including the other three 
main variables with which we have, a priori, the potential issue of simultaneity: 
principal, interest rate and maturity in this case. We then gradually introduce them 
into the model one by one. As we will show in section 3.5, the sign and magnitude of 
the coefficients of independent variables remain almost the same across all these 
estimations giving us comfort that the estimates are robust.  
A large variety of econometric techniques have been used in relevant key 
papers starting from ordinary least square regression by Petersen and Rajan (1994) 
and Blackwell and Winters (1997), logit regression by Berger and Udell (1995), 
multivariate logistic regression by Cole (1998) to multivariate regression with 
difference in differences specification by Dewally and Shao (2014) and bivariate 
probit model by Cenni et al. (2015).  We use the practice of gradually introducing 
exogenous variables which, a priori, may have potential issue of simultaneity  
followed by Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000).  
We start by addressing two research questions relating to the impact of 
relationship strength variables on the risk premium and collateral levels. First we 
examine the impact of relationship strength, credit history of the borrower, 
characteristics of the firm and lender types on the risk premium. Secondly we 
estimate the impact of aforementioned variables on the collateral. We use our whole 
dataset for these estimations. 
In our next set of estimations, we examine how different types of financial 
institutions respond to lending relationships. We split the dataset using eight different 
financial institution types – banks, NBFIs, Government financial institutions, private 
financial institutions, foreign bank, domestic financial institutions, large banks and 
small and medium financial institutions. It is important to note that these categories 
are not mutually exclusive. For example, banks include both foreign banks and 
domestic banks. Our primary aim is to understand the influence of a particular 
characteristic on the impact of relationship length at interest rate and collateral 
requirement. Thus large banks versus small and medium size financial institutions 






Government financial institutions versus private ones will help us to understand the 
impact of ownership and control by the Government.  
The last set of estimations finally uses sub-samples divided both along 
borrower type and lender type, providing us an insight as to how a particular type of 
lender interacts with a particular type of borrower. 
 
3.5 Results 
We start by presenting results of estimations that use the whole dataset. We then 
follow up this discussion with results obtained by running estimations on subsamples 
selected on the basis of type of financial institutions and borrowers.  
 
3.5.1 Lending relationships, risk premiums and collateral requirements 
The results of our first set of estimations relating to impact of bank-borrower 
relationship and other control variables on risk premium and collateral are shown in 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5.  
Table 3.4 
Impact of Relationship Length and Other Variables on the Risk Premium 
Name of Variable Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan 0.020*** 
(0.003) 
Collateral 0.111*** 0.111*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Ln (Principal) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Relationship strength variables
Relationship length (years) -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.059*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Number of loans 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of financing products -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.057*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Lender share in financing 0.016 0.013 0.038*** 0.038*** 






Non fund based facility -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.032*** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default 0.227*** 0.232*** 0.226*** 0.226*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Litigation 0.000 -0.001 0.007 0.008 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Write off -0.801*** -0.789*** -0.785*** -0.784*** 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating -0.427*** -0.427*** -0.428*** -0.429*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
SME firm 0.717*** 0.701*** 0.589*** 0.585*** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Listed firm -0.118** -0.121** -0.113** -0.113** 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) 
Government firm -0.596*** -0.553*** -0.516*** -0.515*** 
(0.140) (0.140) (0.139) (0.139) 
     
     
     
Type of Financial Institution 
NBFI 2.345*** 2.343*** 2.516*** 2.333*** 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) 
Foreign bank 0.227*** 0.190*** 0.215*** 0.128** 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Large bank -0.421*** -0.438*** -0.492*** -0.525*** 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) 
Public sector financial institution -0.318*** -0.305*** -0.402*** -0.425*** 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Constant 4.616*** 4.954*** 4.658*** 4.697*** 
(0.094) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations 1,661,125 1,661,125 1,661,125 1,661,097 
R-square 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 
Wald chi2 362,431 362,779 367,542 367,794 
Degree of freedom 43 45 47 49 
Note: This Table provides results of estimations for risk premium with relationship strength variables and other 
control variables.  Equation 1 is the basic model and then ‘principal’, ‘collateral’ and ‘maturity’ are introduced 
one by one in the subsequent equations. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5% level 







Impact of Relationship Length and Other Variables on the Collateral 
Name of Variable Equation 1@ Equation 2@ Equation 3 Equation 4
        
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Risk Premium 0.019*** 0.019*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Ln (Principal) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Relationship strength variables (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Relationship length (years) 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of loans 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of financing products 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Lender share in financing -0.227*** -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.226*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Non fund based facility -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Default 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Litigation -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.070*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Write off -0.027*** -0.033*** -0.018** -0.018** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rating 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SME firm 0.505*** 0.503*** 0.472*** 0.472*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Listed firm -0.020 -0.019 -0.014 -0.014 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Government firm -0.169*** -0.166*** -0.141** -0.141** 







Type of Financial Institution 
NBFI -0.777*** -0.778*** -0.884*** -0.901*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
Foreign bank -0.110*** -0.113*** -0.121*** -0.129*** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) 
Large bank 0.242*** 0.240*** 0.260*** 0.257*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Public sector financial institution 0.436*** 0.437*** 0.451*** 0.448*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Constant 1.308*** 1.334*** 1.112*** 1.117*** 
(0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Year dummies 
Observations 1,661,125 1,661,125 1,661,125 1,661,097 
Log likelihood /R square 0.15 0.15 -2,016,650 -2,016,610 
Wald chi2 14,975 15,200 19,293 19,314 
Degree of freedom 43 45 47 49 
This Table provides results for first set of estimation – with collateral as dependent variable.  The first equation 
does not include risk premium, principal and maturity – the variables which are considered to have simultaneity 
issue with collateral.  These variables are introduced one by one in estimation in next equations.  As can be 
observed from the results, the size, sign and significance of almost all the variables remain the same indicating 
robustness of the estimates. 
Standard errors in parentheses  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
@ These results have been obtained using multivariate GLS regression since Tobit estimation could not converge 
on a solution for these models.  The comparison of Tobit and multivariate GLS regressions results for equations 3 
and 4 (multivariate GLS regression results for these equations are not included in table, however, are available on 
request) shows almost the same results for both estimation techniques.  This gives us confidence that results 







The size and sign of most of the variables used in the estimations remains almost the 
same as we gradually introduce potentially endogenous variables, giving us 
confidence about the robustness of the estimates. Endogeneity, if present, would lead 
to specification bias and noticeably different coefficient estimates. While empirical 
evidence on the relationship between collateral and risk premium is mixed (Berger et 
al., 2016), our results suggest a positive relationship between these variables 
supporting the findings of Berger and Udell (1990), Godlewski and Weill (2011), 
John et al. (2003) and Godlewski and Weill (2011). 
Table 3.4 shows that coefficients of three of our relationship strength 
variables are significant and negative (coefficients of relationship length, number of 
financing products and non-fund based facility are -0.059, -0.057 and -0.032 
respectively).  This implies that strong relationships with financial institutions are 
largely welfare enhancing as relationships which are longer and benefit from cross 
product synergies – evidenced by the use of different types of financing products and 
non-fund based facilities from a lender - result in lower credit pricing for firms. 
However, firms that become dependent on a particular lender to meet their financing 
requirements are exploited to pay higher interest rates as shown by positive and 
significant coefficient of lender share in financing.  
In terms of collateral, strong lender-borrower relationships are generally 
exploitative: more collateral is required from firms with longer relationships with a 
lender, with more loans from that lender and if multiple financing products are 
obtained from a lender as evidenced by significant and positive coefficients of 
relationship length, number of loans and number of financing products in Table 3.5.  
However, coefficient of lender share in financing is significant and negative showing 
that lenders lower collateral requirements if they are the dominant financier of a firm.  
The exclusivity of relationship has thus two dimensions. It results in high interest 
rate but low collateral and may be a balancing act on part of the lenders to create a 
win-win situation both for them and their customers so that firms do not seek new 







Non-fund based facility is our only relationship strength variable that is 
significant and has negative coefficients both for risk premium and collateral 
estimations in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Thus the borrowers obtaining non-fund based 
facilities from their lenders benefit both in terms of interest rate and collateral. It 
makes sense since non-fund based facilities allow financial institutions to earn 
commission and fee based income. It thus enables them to diversify the sources of 
their income, which in turn may improve their credit rating. 
The above results provide prima facie support the findings of Cornee et al. 
(2012) who observe that long term relationships mitigate default risk thus reducing 
the collateral requirement but also enable the lenders to increase interest rate. Tables 
3.4 and 3.5, however, also show that relationship strength variables are 
overshadowed by type of lender and kind of borrower. For example, the coefficient 
of NBFI (a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the lender is an NBFI) in Table 3.4 
is 2.333 as compared to the coefficient of -0.059 for relationship length. Likewise 
coefficient of SME firm (a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the borrower is an 
SME) in Table 3.5 is 0.472 as compared to 0.004 for number of loans. The 
dominance of these variables reflects the need to examine the lender-borrower 
relationship by fully taking into account their types. We, therefore, proceed to divide 
our sample on the basis of type of financial institution in the next sub-section. 
 
3.5.2 Lending relationships, types of lender and terms of credit 
The above results, however, are preliminary since they do not fully take into account 
the type of lender. To the best of my knowledge, the empirical research on the 
subject has not examined the impact of type of lender on association between 
relationship lending and terms of credit. The study intends to assess the impact of 
type of lender on this important relationship. The type of financial institution has 
important bearing on the choice of lending technology and how the financial 
institutions treat their customers. For example, Berger et al. (2005) observe that 
small banks make more extensive and better use of relationship lending whereas 






Black (2011) find that small banks are better placed for relationship lending. In order 
to understand that interplay between type of lender, relationship lending and terms of 
credit, we divide our sample on the basis of ownership (Government financial 
institutions versus private lenders), size (large banks versus small and medium size 
financial institutions), place of incorporation (foreign versus domestic financial 
institutions) and most importantly constitution (commercial banks versus NBFIs). 
 Table 3.6 provides estimation results of different sub-samples split on the 
basis of type of financial institution for risk premium while Table 3.7 provides that 
for collateral. We observe substantial variation in most of the variables across 
different types of financial institution, substantiating our belief that the type of 
financial institution has an important bearing for the implications of lender-borrower 
relationship. 
While all types of financial institutions reduce interest rates as relationship 
length increases, small and medium financial institutions actually do the opposite and 
increase their interest rates (the coefficient of relationship length in Table 3.6 is 
significant and negative for all types of financial institutions except for small and 
medium financial institutions where it is significant but positive). It has been 
observed that small financial institutions are better able to produce soft information 
as compared to their larger counterparts (Uchida et al., 2012). This competitive 
advantage may enable these institutions to charge higher risk premium from their 
customers. 
The variable ‘number of loans’ has no impact (insignificant) on credit pricing 
as per estimation results of our whole sample shown in Table 3.4. The results in 
Table 3.6, however, narrate a different story. The number of loans is significant and 
positively associated with interest rate in case of public sector financial institutions, 
foreign banks and small and medium financial institutions whereas it is significant 
and negatively associated with interest rate in case of domestic financial institutions, 
large banks and NBFIs. We observe similar sort of variation in the impact of other 





The Influence of Type of Financial Institution on Risk Premium 
Estimation with different types of financial institutions – Dependent variable Risk Premium 
 
  Type of Financial Institution 
Public Private Foreign Domestic Large S&Ma NBFIs Banks 
Name of variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan -0.184*** 0.042*** -0.013 0.019*** 0.122*** -0.031*** -0.308*** 0.042*** 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) 
Collateral 0.059*** 0.121*** 0.172*** 0.105*** 0.141*** 0.091*** 0.384*** 0.103*** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) 
Ln (Principal) -0.003*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.018*** 0.076*** -0.001** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Relationship strength variables         
Relationship length (years) -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.600*** -0.025*** -0.198*** 0.050*** -0.047*** -0.058*** 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.019) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) 
Number of loans 0.022*** -0.001 0.028*** -0.002*** -0.013*** 0.004*** -0.067*** 0.005*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of financing products 0.001 -0.059*** -0.524*** -0.002 -0.011 -0.090*** 0.197*** -0.071*** 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) 
Lender share in financing -0.129*** 0.059*** -0.323*** 0.071*** 0.145*** -0.007 0.057*** 0.003 
(0.032) (0.012) (0.038) (0.012) (0.032) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
Non fund based facility 0.050** -0.039*** 0.310*** -0.057*** -0.116*** 0.014 0.048 -0.009 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.034) (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.052) (0.011) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) 0.005*** 0.023*** 0.062*** 0.015*** 0.039*** 0.004*** -0.017*** 0.029*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default 0.067*** 0.236*** 0.741*** 0.195*** 0.588*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.308*** 






Litigation -0.236*** 0.097*** 1.391*** -0.069*** 0.270*** -0.164*** -0.670*** 0.269*** 
(0.020) (0.013) (0.048) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) 
Write off -0.655*** -0.749*** -0.821*** -0.775*** -1.182*** -0.520*** -0.696*** -0.859*** 
(0.032) (0.027) (0.095) (0.023) (0.044) (0.024) (0.028) (0.030) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.087*** -0.014*** -0.008 -0.024*** -0.009*** -0.020*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Rating 0.264*** -0.625*** -0.602*** -0.418*** -0.549*** -0.395*** -0.460*** -0.501*** 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.027) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008) 
SME firm 0.426*** 0.326*** 0.418*** 0.398*** 0.837*** 0.342*** 0.249*** 0.561*** 
(0.082) (0.038) (0.157) (0.035) (0.047) (0.050) (0.089) (0.035) 
Listed firm -0.417*** -0.156*** -0.610*** -0.176*** 0.013 -0.258*** 0.120 -0.232*** 
(0.087) (0.060) (0.159) (0.054) (0.096) (0.058) (0.091) (0.059) 
Government firm -0.462 -0.866*** -0.151 -0.784*** -0.231 -0.915*** -1.089** -0.498*** 
(0.280) (0.164) (0.482) (0.150) (0.216) (0.183) (0.454) (0.143) 
Constant 4.395*** 5.959*** 4.472*** 5.802*** 3.326*** 6.310*** 8.573*** 4.411*** 
(0.240) (0.111) (0.402) (0.104) (0.184) (0.122) (0.262) (0.112) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 275,029 1,386,068 107,211 1,553,886 556,576 1,104,521 403,206 1,257,891 
R-square 0.28 0.17 0.27 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.31 0.16 
Wald chi2 106,146 287,437 40,959 334,730 105,183 308,505 182,635 238,288 
Degree of freedom 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Note: This Table provides estimations for risk premium for sub-samples split on the basis of type of financial institutions.   
Standard errors in parentheses  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 








The Influence of Type of Financial Institution on Levels of Collateral 
Estimation with different types of financial institutions – Dependent variable collateral 
  Type of Financial Institutions 
Public Private@ Foreign Domestic Large S&M@ a NBFIs@ Banks 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan 0.001 0.004*** 0.088*** -0.004*** -0.044*** 0.029*** -0.046*** 0.002 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Risk Premium 0.014*** 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.020*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln (Principal) -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.000 -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.005*** 0.002*** -0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Relationship strength variables 
Relationship length (years) -0.005 0.011*** 0.066*** 0.005** 0.019*** 0.005** -0.015*** 0.021*** 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Number of loans 0.033*** 0.003*** 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of financing products 0.055*** 0.026*** -0.038*** 0.044*** -0.006** 0.052*** 0.076*** 0.036*** 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Lender share in financing -0.256*** -0.224*** -0.349*** -0.213*** -0.286*** -0.212*** -0.026*** -0.362*** 
(0.015) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) 
Non fund based facility -0.020 -0.035*** 0.028** -0.032*** 0.032*** -0.061*** 0.045*** -0.034*** 
(0.011) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) 0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Default 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.109*** 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.006*** 0.079*** 






Litigation -0.131*** -0.054*** 0.077*** -0.079*** -0.154*** -0.021*** 0.035*** -0.110*** 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Write off -0.101*** 0.001 0.002 -0.021** -0.122*** 0.035*** 0.026*** -0.040*** 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.041) (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.009*** -0.020*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rating 0.058*** 0.024*** -0.100*** 0.031*** 0.003 0.026*** 0.093*** -0.023*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
SME firm 0.231*** 0.694*** 0.331*** 0.597*** 0.554*** 0.256*** 0.077*** 0.568*** 
(0.042) (0.016) (0.059) (0.016) (0.026) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017) 
Listed firm -0.064 0.035 0.068 0.020 0.047 -0.012 0.033 0.017 
(0.043) (0.026) (0.062) (0.024) (0.043) (0.024) (0.019) (0.028) 
Government firm -0.108 -0.060 0.054 -0.062 -0.060 -0.033 0.340*** -0.122 
(0.143) (0.072) (0.181) (0.069) (0.119) (0.072) (0.107) (0.071) 
Constant 1.464*** 0.942*** 1.210*** 1.018*** 0.249** 1.585*** 0.910*** 0.690*** 
(0.124) (0.050) (0.152) (0.049) (0.102) (0.049) (0.064) (0.057) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 275,029 1,386,068 107,211 1,553,886 556,576 1,104,521 403,206 1,257,891 
Log likelihood  / R-square -315,052 0.10 -124,361 -1,892,079 -708,917 0.06 0.26 -1,681,340 
Wald chi2 3475.61 14109.84 5423.68 13162.33 8737.84 10260.06 13000.02 13927.74 
Degree of freedom 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Note: This Table provides estimations for collateral for sub-samples split on the basis of type of financial institutions.   
@ Estimation at columns 2, 6 & 7 used multivariate GLS regression since Tobit regression is not able to converge on a solution for these sub-samples estimation.  As earlier 
explained, however, the results of estimations using multivariate GLS regression (these results are not included in the tables but available on request) and Tobit are almost the same 
for other equations.  This gives us confidence on the reliability of these results. 
Standard errors in parentheses  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
a: Small and medium size financial institutions 
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 We observe relatively less variation in Table 3.7. The number of loans is 
significant and positively associated with collateral (results in higher collateral) 
across all types of financial institutions and lender’s share is significant and 
negatively associated with collateral for every type of financial institution. The 
length of relationship, although significant and positive for all other types of 
institutions, is insignificant for public sector financial institutions and negatively 
associated with collateral for NBFIs. This shows that NBFIs are the only institutions 
that reduce collateral requirements for their customers with longer relationships. 
NBFIs are constrained both by their small size and limitations on their operations 
(for example NBFIs cannot attract demand deposits and cannot undertake a number 
of other banking activities) and lower collateral requirements may be an effort on 
their part to retain their customer base. In the remaining two relationship strength 
variables, number of products and non-fund based facility, we observe even higher 
level of variation between different types of lenders. 
 The response of a particular type of financial institution towards different 
relationship dimensions is also not uniform. For example, for public sector financial 
institutions, the coefficients of relationship length and lender share in financing are 
significant and negative in Table 3.6 while those of number of loans and non-fund 
based facility are significant and positive. This shows that public sector financial 
institutions charge lower risk premium from firms as length of their relationship 
increases or they become dominant financier of a firm.  However, they charge higher 
interest rates when firms obtain larger number of loans or non-fund based facilities 
from them. Large banks, on the other hand, reduce credit pricing in these situations 
but charge higher interest rates as a borrower becomes more reliant on them.   
It seems that financial institutions respond to different relationship strength 
variables according to their peculiar circumstances. For example, foreign banks and 
public sector financial institutions charge higher interest rates from firms that obtain 
non-fund based facilities (like letters of credit and guarantees) from them unlike 
private and domestic financial institutions, which reduce interest rates for such 
borrowers. The credit rating of domestic financial institutions in Pakistan is 
constrained by the sovereign rating of the country (Which was below investment 
grade during larger period of 2006-13). In many cases, an investment grade or better 






such circumstances, firms may be constrained to approach foreign banks to obtain 
these facilities, enabling such foreign banks to exploit this position. In Government 
related transactions, a guarantee from a public sector institutions may be required or 
preferred, forcing the firms to foster and maintain relationships with these 
institutions. 
 As observed in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, the variables related to type of firm still 
dominate the relationship strength variables in terms of magnitude of coefficients 
both in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.  For example, the coefficients of Government firm (a 
dummy variable for control identifying Government firms in our dataset) in Table 
3.6 ranges between -0.498 to -1.089 as compared to -0.025 to -0.600 for relationship 
length. This reflects the need to go a step further in bifurcation of our dataset and 
examine the relationship both by type of the borrower and the lender. We, therefore, 
delve deeper and partition our dataset both by type of financial institution and type of 
firm in the next section. 
 
3.5.3 Lending relationships, type of firm-lender and terms of credit 
Firm’s characteristics significantly affect the bank-borrower lending relationship and 
its implications. Bharath et al. (2007) and Mudd (2013) observe that smaller firms 
are more inclined to use a relationship lender for their loans. Larger firms are found 
to experience no significant difference in interest rates for loans from a relationship 
lender or other lenders (Bharath et al., 2011).   
 Tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 provide the results of estimations run on sub-samples 
split both by type of the borrower and the lender.  We start with the results for SMEs 




Table 3.8 Panel A 
Estimations for Risk Premium for SMEs by Different types of Financial Institutions 
  Type of Financial Institution 
Public private Foreign Domestic Large S&Ma NBFIs Banks 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan -0.374*** 0.180*** 0.134*** 0.160*** 0.262*** 0.039*** -0.558*** 0.187*** 
(0.024) (0.008) (0.035) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.041) (0.008) 
Collateral 0.095*** 0.134*** 0.040 0.130*** 0.148*** 0.080*** 0.847*** 0.123*** 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.021) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.025) (0.005) 
Ln (Principal) 0.011*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008*** 0.028*** 0.096*** -0.006*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Relationship strength variables 
Relationship length (years) -0.256*** -0.001 -0.191*** -0.033** 0.012 -0.011 -0.077*** -0.007 
(0.026) (0.014) (0.046) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) 
Number of loans 0.116*** -0.067*** 0.064** -0.072*** -0.160*** -0.060*** -0.181*** -0.050*** 
(0.031) (0.007) (0.031) (0.006) (0.021) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) 
Number of financing products 0.063 0.180*** -0.127 0.179*** 0.345*** 0.056** 0.246*** 0.124*** 
(0.052) (0.022) (0.070) (0.021) (0.038) (0.022) (0.068) (0.022) 
Lender share in financing 0.279 0.078 -0.231 0.107** 0.319*** -0.011 -0.006 0.181*** 
(0.150) (0.048) (0.129) (0.047) (0.115) (0.039) (0.043) (0.066) 
Non fund based facility -0.301*** -0.133*** -0.358*** -0.137*** -0.361*** 0.063 0.236 -0.121*** 
(0.076) (0.041) (0.131) (0.038) (0.060) (0.040) (0.164) (0.039) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) -0.022*** 0.037*** 0.003 0.028*** 0.039*** -0.009*** -0.037*** 0.036*** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Default 0.602*** 0.412*** 0.318*** 0.514*** 0.826*** 0.028 -0.269*** 0.658*** 
(0.040) (0.024) (0.063) (0.022) (0.034) (0.023) (0.030) (0.025) 
Litigation -0.133** 0.352*** 0.617*** 0.322*** 0.441*** -0.237*** -1.128*** 0.472*** 






Write off -0.905*** -0.678*** -1.379*** -0.733*** -0.732*** -0.813*** -2.158*** -0.441*** 
(0.203) (0.108) (0.324) (0.101) (0.136) (0.128) (0.144) (0.114) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships 0.142*** -0.076*** 0.126** -0.056*** -0.150*** 0.019 0.099*** -0.117*** 
(0.044) (0.018) (0.052) (0.017) (0.037) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023) 
Rating -0.028 -0.037** -0.588*** -0.034** 0.169*** -0.587*** -0.300*** -0.147*** 
(0.031) (0.017) (0.079) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.062) (0.018) 
Constant 5.977*** 7.266*** -0.266 7.128*** 6.974*** 9.041*** 12.586*** 5.944*** 
(1.241) (0.356) (3.777) (0.345) (0.639) (0.498) (0.849) (0.408) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 47,106 308,838 12,837 343,107 206,528 149,416 53,911 302,033 
R-square 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.26 0.13 
Wald Chi2 14,294 51,571 7,437 56,572 34,409 43,199 31,756 47,991 
Degree of freedom 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Note: This Table shows the estimation results of risk premium models for SME firms across different types of financial institutions 
Standard errors in parentheses  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 








Table 3.8 Panel B 
Estimations for Collateral for SMEs by Different types of Financial Institutions 
  Type of Financial Institutions 
Public Private Foreign Domestic Large S&Ma NBFIs@ Banks 
Name of Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan -0.008 -0.044*** 0.026 -0.044*** -0.086*** 0.017*** -0.017** -0.050*** 
(0.012) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) 
Risk Premium 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.007 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln (Principal) -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.006*** 0.002*** -0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Relationship strength variables 
Relationship length (years) 0.008 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.044*** 0.078*** 0.003 -0.039*** 0.063*** 
(0.013) (0.005) (0.020) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
Number of loans 0.043*** 0.008*** 0.022 0.009*** 0.030*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.005 
(0.015) (0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Number of financing products 0.023 0.099*** -0.067** 0.101*** -0.060*** 0.225*** 0.214*** 0.106*** 
(0.025) (0.008) (0.030) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) 
Lender share in financing -0.382*** -0.143*** -0.516*** -0.128*** -0.218*** -0.151*** -0.003 -0.315*** 
(0.073) (0.018) (0.055) (0.018) (0.042) (0.018) (0.007) (0.027) 
Non fund based facility -0.334*** -0.062*** 0.517*** -0.123*** 0.094*** -0.281*** -0.347*** -0.102*** 
(0.037) (0.016) (0.056) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.028) (0.016) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.003 -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.000 0.000 -0.008*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Default 0.184*** 0.076*** 0.024 0.100*** 0.146*** 0.077*** 0.016*** 0.140*** 






Litigation -0.453*** -0.207*** 0.149*** -0.240*** -0.302*** -0.120*** 0.158*** -0.277*** 
(0.032) (0.011) (0.055) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) 
Write off -0.308*** 0.131*** 0.850*** 0.038 -0.112** 0.380*** 0.396*** 0.000 
(0.099) (0.041) (0.139) (0.039) (0.050) (0.057) (0.024) (0.046) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships -0.125*** -0.015** -0.032 -0.023*** -0.046*** -0.020*** 0.001 -0.057*** 
(0.022) (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) 
Rating 0.083*** 0.122*** -0.036 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.093*** 0.035*** 0.081*** 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.034) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) 
Constant 2.595*** 0.662*** 1.965 0.837*** 0.785 1.896*** 1.215*** 0.725*** 
(0.727) (0.221) (1.732) (0.219) (0.442) (0.240) (0.225) (0.259) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 47,106 308,838 12,837 343,107 206,528 149,416 53,911 302,033 
Log Likelihood/R-square -57,164 -396,946 -12,412 -441,132 -276,746 -173,634 0.48 -407,800 
Wald Chi2 1,391 6,115 448 6,381 6,996 1,943 5,858 6,851 
Degree of freedom 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Note: This Table shows the estimation results of interest rate model for listed firms across different types of financial institutions 
Standard errors in parentheses  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
@ These results have been obtained using multivariate GLS regression analysis since Tobit estimation could not converge on a solution for sub-sample relating to NBFIs’ loans to 
SMEs.  The comparison of Tobit and multivariate GLS regressions for other sub-samples (multivariate results for other sub-samples are not included in table, however, are available 
on request) shows almost the same results for both estimation techniques.  This gives us confidence that results obtained from multivariate regression are reasonably reliable. 
a








Table 3.9 Panel A 
Estimations for Risk Premium for Listed Firms by Different Types of Financial Institutions 
  Type of Financial Institution 
Public Private Foreign Domestic Large S&Ma NBFIs Banks 
Name of Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan -0.267*** -0.003 -0.330*** 0.012 0.037** -0.035*** -0.148*** -0.025*** 
(0.023) (0.009) (0.034) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.035) (0.009) 
Collateral 0.065*** 0.074*** 0.136*** 0.067*** 0.060*** 0.075*** 0.285*** 0.060*** 
(0.016) (0.008) (0.018) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008) 
Ln (Principal) -0.002 -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.025*** -0.008*** 0.014*** -0.018*** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Relationship strength variables 
Relationship length (years) -0.034 -0.046** -0.107** -0.021 -0.247*** 0.049** -0.149*** 0.000 
(0.035) (0.022) (0.055) (0.020) (0.042) (0.021) (0.032) (0.023) 
Number of loans 0.029*** 0.006*** 0.013 0.006*** -0.012*** 0.020*** -0.017*** 0.008*** 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.029) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
Number of financing products 0.054** -0.040*** -0.238*** -0.009 0.028 -0.068*** -0.153*** -0.021** 
(0.024) (0.010) (0.041) (0.010) (0.016) (0.011) (0.048) (0.010) 
Lender share in financing -0.440*** -0.022 -0.416*** -0.045 0.132 -0.106** 0.126 -0.144*** 
(0.078) (0.046) (0.135) (0.042) (0.075) (0.048) (0.068) (0.048) 
Non fund based facility -0.118** -0.048 0.244*** -0.101*** -0.339*** 0.088*** 0.114 -0.041 







Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.048*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.028*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Default 0.091 -0.067** -0.268*** -0.026 -0.001 -0.044 0.396*** -0.198*** 
(0.051) (0.031) (0.080) (0.029) (0.057) (0.030) (0.042) (0.033) 
Litigation 0.104** 0.202*** 0.216 0.112*** 0.665*** 0.046 -0.351*** 0.476*** 
(0.054) (0.042) (0.160) (0.035) (0.079) (0.037) (0.048) (0.045) 
Write off -0.499*** 0.154** -2.896*** -0.047 -0.680*** 0.166*** 0.267*** -0.308*** 
(0.077) (0.066) (0.385) (0.053) (0.113) (0.058) (0.069) (0.071) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships 0.003 0.006 -0.042*** 0.013*** 0.025*** -0.005 -0.000 0.004 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Rating -0.062 -0.446*** 0.107 -0.487*** -0.827*** -0.184*** -0.244*** -0.559*** 
(0.044) (0.030) (0.092) (0.027) (0.048) (0.030) (0.045) (0.032) 
Constant 3.707*** 4.730*** 4.411*** 4.337*** 1.991*** 4.750*** 4.926*** 4.047*** 
(0.581) (0.359) (0.797) (0.346) (0.762) (0.343) (0.746) (0.360) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 23,854 97,542 15,106 106,290 32,641 88,755 29,136 92,260 
R-square 0.13 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.14 
Wald Chi2 5,857 13,623 2,136 16,739 7,296 12,098 8,177 12,114 
Degree of freedom 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Note: This Table shows the estimation results for risk premium charged by different types of financial institutions on loans to listed firms. 
Standard errors in parentheses  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
a







Table 3.9 Panel B 
Estimations for Collateral Requirements for Loans to Listed Firms by Different Types of Financial Institutions 
  Type of Financial Institution 
Publica Private Foreign Domestic Large S&Ma NBFIs@ Banks 
Name of variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan 0.011 0.020*** 0.102*** 0.005 0.020*** 0.019*** -0.024*** 0.021*** 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) 
Risk Premium 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln (Principal) -0.005*** 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Relationship strength variables 
Relationship length (years) -0.033** -0.018 -0.018 -0.025*** -0.056*** -0.005 -0.002 -0.023** 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.025) (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) 
Number of loans 0.037*** 0.008*** -0.016 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of financing products 0.091*** 0.023*** -0.087*** 0.053*** 0.071*** 0.004 -0.077*** 0.038*** 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) 
Lender share in financing -0.200*** -0.664*** -0.857*** -0.564*** -0.554*** -0.595*** -0.104*** -0.722*** 
(0.032) (0.019) (0.062) (0.017) (0.029) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021) 
Non fund based facility -0.174*** -0.042*** 0.151*** -0.077*** -0.097*** -0.029** 0.231*** -0.064*** 







Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) -0.004*** 0.007*** 0.022*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.003*** -0.001 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default 0.067*** 0.090*** 0.294*** 0.054*** 0.119*** 0.071*** 0.083*** 0.089*** 
(0.021) (0.013) (0.037) (0.012) (0.022) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015) 
Litigation 0.006 0.159*** 0.103 0.113*** 0.299*** 0.059*** -0.039*** 0.196*** 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.074) (0.014) (0.031) (0.016) (0.012) (0.020) 
Write off 0.068** 0.001 -0.400** 0.036 0.003 0.031 -0.015 0.074** 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.177) (0.022) (0.044) (0.025) (0.017) (0.031) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships -0.015*** -0.011*** 0.029*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Rating -0.084*** -0.017 0.020 -0.011 -0.022 -0.084*** 0.034*** -0.062*** 
(0.018) (0.013) (0.042) (0.011) (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) 
Constant 1.268*** 0.951*** 1.030*** 1.101*** 0.531 1.121*** 0.970*** 0.947*** 
(0.307) (0.127) (0.288) (0.133) (0.307) (0.128) (0.249) (0.141) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 23,854 97,542 15,106 106,290 32,641 88,755 29,136 92,260 
Log likelihood/R-square 0.07 -120,402 -19,703 -125,180 -40,760 -104,523 0.17 -120,372 
Wald Chi2 881 1,990 993 2,053 1,119 1,367 852 1,937 
Degree of freedom 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
Note: This Table shows the estimation results of interest rate model for listed firms across different types of financial institutions 
Standard errors in parentheses  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
@ These results have been obtained using multivariate GLS regression analysis since Tobit estimation could not converge on a solution for sub-sample relating to NBFIs’ loans to 
SMEs.  The comparison of Tobit and multivariate GLS regressions for other sub-samples (multivariate results for other sub-samples are not included in table, however, are available 
on request) shows almost the same results for both estimation techniques.  This gives us confidence that results obtained from multivariate regression are reasonably reliable. 







Table 3.10 Panel A 
Estimations for Risk Premium for Government Firms by Different Types of Financial Institutions 
  Types of Financial Institutions 
Public Private Foreign Domestic Large S&Ma NBFIs Banks 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan -0.023 -0.157*** 0.204** -0.138*** -0.192*** -0.048 -0.652*** -0.121*** 
(0.041) (0.025) (0.083) (0.023) (0.033) (0.029) (0.166) (0.022) 
Collateral -0.069** -0.073*** -0.108 -0.079*** -0.019 -0.133*** 0.110 -0.080*** 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.072) (0.022) (0.032) (0.028) (0.081) (0.021) 
Ln (Principal) 0.018** -0.004 -0.037*** 0.004 -0.002 -0.010 0.038** -0.003 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.016) (0.004) 
Relationship strength variables 
Relationship length (years) -0.010 0.263*** -0.198 0.203*** 0.144 0.197*** 0.123 0.180*** 
(0.080) (0.059) (0.124) (0.052) (0.080) (0.061) (0.143) (0.052) 
Number of loans -0.043 -0.041*** -0.193 -0.049*** -0.031*** -0.140*** -0.951*** -0.036*** 
(0.027) (0.007) (0.109) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.068) (0.007) 
Number of financing products -0.489*** 0.381*** -0.044 0.334*** 0.329*** 0.470*** 0.884 0.304*** 
(0.119) (0.044) (0.197) (0.042) (0.057) (0.061) (0.630) (0.040) 
Lender share in financing 0.691** -0.041 0.408 -0.117 -0.304 0.075 -0.092 -0.024 
(0.293) (0.124) (0.284) (0.119) (0.226) (0.127) (0.278) (0.121) 
Non fund based facility 0.917*** -0.262** 2.347*** -0.378*** -0.629*** -0.073 -0.181 







Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) -0.058*** -0.010 0.003 -0.024*** -0.023** -0.012** -0.035*** -0.017*** 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.019) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) 
Default 0.742*** 0.259*** -0.678*** 0.538*** 0.801*** 0.058 0.628*** 0.376*** 
(0.129) (0.099) (0.258) (0.085) (0.133) (0.103) (0.193) (0.090) 
Litigation -0.179 -0.926*** - -0.600*** -1.118*** -0.302 -0.627** -0.378** 
(0.173) (0.215) - (0.142) (0.201) (0.198) (0.252) (0.173) 
Write off - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships -0.079*** 0.015 0.091*** -0.009 -0.016 -0.005 -0.110** 0.016 
(0.024) (0.015) (0.033) (0.014) (0.022) (0.017) (0.043) (0.014) 
Rating 0.609*** -0.628*** -0.562** -0.028 0.189** -0.442*** -0.317 -0.064 
(0.083) (0.090) (0.231) (0.066) (0.090) (0.092) (0.382) (0.066) 
Constant 2.249 5.356*** 2.339 4.407*** 3.994** 6.731*** 4.825 3.631*** 
(1.698) (1.078) (5.692) (0.945) (1.606) (1.041) (5.216) (0.914) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 3,019 9,617 1,174 11,462 4,995 7,641 1,411 11,225 
R-square 0.43 0.18 0.40 0.20 0.29 0.26 0.49 0.20 
Wald Chi2 . . . . . . . . 
Degree of freedom 40 40 38 40 40 40 38 40 
Note: This Table shows the estimation results of collateral model for listed firms across different types of financial institutions. 
Standard errors in parentheses  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 








Table 3.10 Panel B 
Estimations for Collateral for Loans to Government Firms by Different Types of Financial Institutions 
  Type of Financial Institutions 
Public Private Foreign Domestic Large S&Ma NBFIs Banks 
Name of Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan -0.224*** 0.022** 0.053 -0.030*** 0.003 -0.038*** -0.229*** -0.015 
(0.026) (0.010) (0.034) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.055) (0.010) 
Risk Premium -0.027** -0.011*** -0.019 -0.015*** -0.004 -0.024*** 0.012 -0.016*** 
(0.012) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) 
Ln (Principal) -0.005 -0.005*** -0.008** -0.005** 0.002 -0.011*** -0.002 -0.006*** 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Relationship strength variables 
Relationship length (years) -0.007 0.037 -0.002 0.030 -0.008 0.060** -0.073 0.038 
(0.050) (0.023) (0.051) (0.023) (0.037) (0.026) (0.048) (0.023) 
Number of loans -0.003 0.011*** 0.034 0.010*** 0.007 0.029*** 0.209*** 0.008** 
(0.017) (0.003) (0.045) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.024) (0.003) 
Number of financing products 0.437*** 0.061*** 0.172** 0.093*** 0.059** 0.092*** -0.206 0.095*** 
(0.075) (0.017) (0.081) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.210) (0.018) 
Lender share in financing -0.528*** -0.575*** -0.722*** -0.570*** -0.532*** -0.627*** -0.113 -0.697*** 
(0.183) (0.048) (0.115) (0.052) (0.103) (0.053) (0.093) (0.054) 
Non fund based facility -0.020 -0.009 -0.092 0.019 0.145 -0.076 -0.018 







Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) 0.035*** -0.006** 0.003 0.003 0.009** -0.002 0.025*** -0.009*** 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Default -0.439*** 0.034 0.067 -0.124*** -0.052 -0.146*** 0.205*** -0.140*** 
(0.081) (0.039) (0.106) (0.038) (0.061) (0.044) (0.064) (0.040) 
Litigation -0.610*** 0.017 - -0.265*** 0.496*** -1.141*** -0.045 -0.310*** 
(0.108) (0.084) - (0.062) (0.092) (0.082) (0.084) (0.077) 
Write off - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships -0.064*** -0.008 -0.004 -0.019*** -0.030*** -0.012 -0.009 -0.015** 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) 
Rating 0.207*** -0.039 0.446*** -0.020 0.052 -0.152*** 0.949*** -0.007 
(0.052) (0.035) (0.094) (0.029) (0.041) (0.039) (0.125) (0.030) 
Constant 0.850 1.620*** 4.589*** 1.007** -0.108 2.596*** -0.169 1.201*** 
(0.971) (0.442) (0.914) (0.416) (0.623) (0.543) (1.454) (0.435) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 3,019 9,617 1,174 11,462 4,995 7,641 1,411 11,225 
Log likelihood/R-square -3,691 -,691 -832 -12,675 -5,709 -7,766 -1,100 -12,337 
Wald Chi2 332 347 484 343 193 570 441 441 
Degree of freedom 40 40 38 40 40 40 38 40 
This Table shows the estimation results of collateral model for Government firms across different types of financial institutions 
Standard errors in parentheses  
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 









3.5.3.1 SMEs, lending relationships and terms of credit  
Panels A and B of Table 3.8 provide the estimation results for SMEs across different 
types of financial institutions for the risk premium and collateral, respectively. While 
interpreting the results, we need to take into account that SMEs by their very nature 
are constrained in terms of availability of collateral. Thus higher collateral 
requirements are perhaps a bigger deterrent for them compared to higher interest 
rates. NBFIs are, however, the only financial institutions, which require less 
collateral from SMEs as the duration of their relationship increases (the coefficient of 
relationship length for NBFIs in Panel B of Table 3.8 is significant and negative 
whereas it is either significant and positive or insignificant for all other types of 
financial institutions). SMEs can, however, economize on collateral by concentrating 
their borrowings from one lender as it reduces the collateral requirements across 
almost all types of financial institutions as reflected by negative coefficient of lender 
share in financing in Panel B of Table 3.8. 
One rationale of keeping the financial institutions in the public sector is that 
they support small businesses. Public sector financial institutions in Pakistan do 
reduce risk premium for their SME borrowers as relationship length increases (the 
relationship length is significant with coefficient of -0.256) although NBFIs and 
even foreign banks also follow the same practice (but the coefficient of relationship 
length is much smaller at -0.077 and -0.191 respectively). Public sector financial 
institutions further also reduce credit pricing as well as collateral if SMEs obtain 
non-fund based facilities from them. Larger number of loans from such institutions, 
however, exposes SMEs to both higher risk premium as well as larger collateral 
requirements. 
Foreign banks and large banks are considered unsuitable for small firms 
(Berger et al., 2005; Pennathur and Vishwasrao, 2014). We, however, observe a 
mixed pattern in the Pakistani dataset. As relationship length increases, both foreign 
banks and large banks require SMEs to post larger collateral as shown by positive 
coefficients of relationship length in Panel B of Table 3.8. These are also the only 
type of financial institutions that require more collateral if SMEs obtain non-fund 






and positive for foreign banks and large banks while they are significant and negative 
for all other types of financial institutions). The number of financing products and 
lender share in financing are significant and negatively associated with collateral 
both for foreign and large banks showing that use of multiple financing products and 
concentration of borrowings by SMEs with such banks result in lower collateral 
levels.  Foreign banks also charge lower risk premium from SMEs with longer 
relationships with them. 
 SMEs are clearly confronted with a choice. If they want to pay lower interest 
rate, relationship with public financial institutions, foreign banks and NBFIs is more 
useful.  Alternatively if they are constrained by the availability of collateral, they 
should either maintain relationship with NBFIs or concentrate their borrowings with 
one lender since the coefficient of lender’s share in Table 3.8 panel B is negative for 
all types of financial institutions except NBFIs. Another option for SMEs to save on 
interest rate is to use the same lender for obtaining loans as well as non-fund based 
facilities as reflected by a negative coefficient of non-fund based facility.   
 
3.5.3.2 Listed companies, lending relationships and terms of credit 
Table 3.9 panels A and B present results of estimations for listed companies with 
different types of financial institutions for interest rate and collateral. The prior 
research has found the lending relationships for listed firms to be less useful because 
of lower degree of information asymmetry as compared to small businesses (Bharath 
et al., 2007; Bharath et al., 2011). We, however, find significant impact on both 
interest rate and collateral across almost all types of financial institutions in various 
relationship dimensions that we examine. The results show that relationship length is 
significant with negative coefficients both in Panels A and B of Table 3.9 for large 
banks showing that the longer relationships with large banks benefit listed companies 
both through low risk premium as well as reduced collateral. Private financial 
institutions, foreign banks and NBFIs reduce interest rate only (without any impact 
on collateral) while public sector financial institutions and domestic banks lower the 






The exclusivity of relationship through concentrated borrowing with one 
lender results in low collateral across all types of financial institutions and also 
delivers low risk premium if the lender is a public sector financial institution, a 
foreign bank or a small and medium financial institution as shown by negative 
coefficients of lender share in financing in Panels A and B of Table 3.9. Listed 
companies using multiple financing products of a lender are generally able to get 
financing at cheaper rate although it results in higher collateral requirement in case of 
certain types of lenders.   
 
3.5.3.3 Government firms, lending relationships and terms of credit 
While the Government firms in Pakistan do default on their bank loans, there is not a 
single instance of any write off relating to Government firms in our dataset. 
Government firms enjoy the implicit backing of the Government and many of them 
obtain regular budgetary support to meet their operational and financing needs (Syed 
et al., 2012). This advantageous position helps them to obtain loans from the 
financial sector on preferential terms and conditions as evidenced by negative 
coefficients of variable ‘Government firm’ in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. The strength of 
their relationships with financial institutions, however, leads to different kinds of 
results. Table 3.10 panel A and panel B show the estimation results for Government 
firms with different types of financial institutions. The relationship length is either 
positively associated with higher risk premium and larger collateral or is insignificant 
across various types of financial institutions showing that longer lending 
relationships for Government firms are generally exploitative. The private and 
domestic financial institutions increase the risk premium as relationship length 
increases while small and medium size financial institutions increase both the risk 
premium and collateral. 
 One would generally expect that Government firms would be facilitated by 
public sector financial institutions since both are owned and controlled by the 
Government. However, public sector financial institutions actually are the only 






become more reliant on them to meet their financing needs (the coefficient of 
lender’s share in Panel A of Table 3.10 for public sector financial institutions is 
0.691 while it is insignificant for all other types of lenders). Likewise, these 
institutions also charge higher interest rates from Government firms when they 
obtain non-fund based facilities from them. Other types of financial institutions, with 
the exception of foreign banks, in fact, reduce their credit pricing on loans to 
Government firms in such situation. In addition, all types of lenders, again with the 
exception of public sector financial institutions and foreign banks, reduce interest 
rates when Government firms obtain more loans from them. 
 The only way for Government firm to economize on collateral is by 
concentrating their borrowings since it reduces collateral across all types of banks. 
The concentration of credit at one bank does not have any impact on interest rate 
except as earlier mentioned, public sector financial institutions increase interest rates 
in this situation. Higher number of loans and financing products result in larger 
collateral across almost all types of financial institutions. The inefficient utilization 
of collateral in this manner may be the result of poor collateral management on 
behalf of Government firms since allocation of collateral across different loans and 
products requires certain level of professional expertise. 
 
3.5.4 Influence of heterogeneity between firms on the impact of relationship 
length 
In sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3, we observed that as we dissected the dataset, first by type 
of financial institutions and then by both the types of firms and financial institutions, 
our estimates changed. This provided us useful insights about the influence of type of 
firm and type of financial institution on our results. As a final step, we assess the 
impact of heterogeneity between individual firms by allowing the coefficient of our 
most important relationship variable, relationship length, vary across firms. Our 
previous estimation techniques implicitly assume that estimated coefficients of 






coefficient model allows the coefficient of independent variables to change between 
firms and also enables us to predict the coefficient for each firm in our sample.42 
Y*it =  + Xit  +Zit μi + εit 
 Where Xit is the set of independent variables with fixed coefficients 
whereas Zit is the variable with random coefficient. The μi is the random coefficient 
that varies across firms and in turn may be considered as a combination of fixed 
component and a random component.   
Figure 3.1 presents the frequency distribution graph for predicted coefficients 






                                                 
42 We only use coefficient of relationship length as a random parameter since it is the most extensively 
used variable in research on relationship lending.  Further, when we use other relationship variables as 
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The substantial dispersion in the estimated coefficient of relationship length 
for both the dependent variables shows the impact of heterogeneity between firms 
and substantiates our argument that the individual firm characteristics play an 
important role in deciding the way firms are treated by their lenders as duration of 
relationship increases. The comparison of the graphs also show that dispersion in the 
coefficient of relationship length is wider for dependent variable risk premium that 
that for collateral, implying that discriminant treatment on the basis of relationship 
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Comparison of Earlier Estimation Results with Random Coefficient Model for 
Risk Premium 








Maturity of Loan 0.020*** 0.034*** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Collateral 0.111*** 0.080*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Ln (Principal) 0.007*** 0.005*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Relationship strength variables 
Relationship length (years) -0.059*** -0.143*** 0.897 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Number of loans -0.001 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Number of financing products -0.057*** -0.020*** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Lender share in financing 0.038*** -0.003 
(0.011) (0.012) 
Non fund based facility -0.032*** -0.050*** 
(0.010) (0.010) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) 0.019*** 0.010*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Default 0.226*** 0.112*** 
(0.008) (0.009) 
Litigation 0.008 0.153*** 
(0.011) (0.014) 
Write off -0.784*** -0.183*** 
(0.022) (0.025) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships -0.022*** -0.017*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Rating -0.429*** -0.224*** 
(0.006) (0.007) 
SME firm 0.585*** 0.663*** 
(0.034) (0.043) 
Listed firm -0.113** -0.395*** 
(0.050) (0.061) 








Type of Financial Institution 
NBFI 2.333*** 2.357*** 
(0.042) (0.053) 
Foreign bank 0.128** 0.077 
(0.054) (0.070) 
Large bank -0.525*** -0.483*** 
(0.034) (0.043) 
Public sector financial institution -0.425*** -0.411*** 
(0.038) (0.049) 
Constant 4.697*** 4.509*** 4.819 
(0.099) (0.133) (0.019) 
Year dummies Included Included 
Observations 1,661,097 1,661,097 
R-square/ Log likelihood 0.22 -3,235,032 
Wald chi2 367,794 289,650   
Degree of freedom 49  49 
LR test vs. linear regression 
chi2(3) =  2.3e+06   Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000    
Note: This Table presents comparison of results in Table 3.4 with results of random coefficient model 
** significant at 5% level 








Comparison of Earlier Estimation Results with Random Coefficient Model for 
Collateral 









    
Loan Characteristics 
Maturity of Loan 0.004*** 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Risk Premium 0.019*** 0.013*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Ln (Principal) -0.003*** -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Relationship strength variables 
Relationship length (years) 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.383  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Number of loans 0.004*** 0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Number of financing products 0.032*** 0.033*** 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Lender share in financing -0.226*** -0.260*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Non fund based facility -0.031*** -0.019*** 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Ln (Overdues) 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Default 0.053*** 0.044*** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Litigation -0.070*** 0.033*** 
(0.005) (0.005) 
Write off -0.018** -0.020** 
(0.009) (0.010) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of lending relationships -0.015*** -0.011*** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Rating 0.020*** -0.018*** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
SME firm 0.472*** 0.512*** 
(0.015) (0.019) 
Listed firm -0.014 -0.097*** 
(0.022) (0.026) 







Type of Financial Institution 
NBFI -0.901*** -0.964*** 
(0.019) (0.024) 
Foreign bank -0.129*** -0.202*** 
(0.025) (0.031) 
Large bank 0.257*** 0.282*** 
(0.015) (0.019) 
Public sector financial institution 0.448*** 0.375*** 
(0.017) (0.022) 
Constant 1.117*** 1.074*** 1.476 
(0.045) (0.057) (0.006) 
Year dummies Included Included 
Observations 1,661,097 1,661,097 
Log likelihood -2,016,610 - 1,663,697 
Wald chi2 19,314 154,556 
Degree of freedom 49 49 
LR test vs. linear regression: 
chi2(3) =  4.3e+05   Prob. > chi2 = 0.0000    
Note: This Table presents comparison of results in Table 3.5 with results of random coefficient model 
** significant at 5% level 









 We present the comparisons of our earlier results with the estimates of 
random coefficient model for risk premium and collateral in Tables 3.11 and 3.12.  
Likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics provided at the bottom of these tables compare 
the fitted model (random coefficient) with standard regression and reject the null 
hypothesis that random effect in the coefficient is zero. The comparison of results in 
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 shows that the sign and significance of relationship length both 
for collateral and risk premium remain the same albeit size of the coefficient 
becomes larger. Importantly, however, dispersion of the coefficient reflected by its 
standard deviation (0.383 versus 0.011 for collateral and 0.897 versus 0.143 for risk 
premium) substantiates our earlier evidence that the impact of relationship length 
across different firms varies very substantially. This shows that firm level 
characteristics play an important role in determining the impact of relationship length 
on collateral and credit pricing. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
We examine the impact of relationship on the interest rate and collateral levels across 
various types of lenders and borrowers by using a unique dataset, which covers each 
and every commercial loan generated during April 2006 to December 2013 in 
Pakistan. On an aggregate basis, we find that increase in relationship length results in 
higher interest rates but lower collateral levels. However, further examination paints 
a far more complex picture. We observe that impact of relationship on interest rate 
and collateral varies substantially with type of lender and borrower as well as across 
different relationship dimensions. We find it particularly noteworthy that firm level 
heterogeneity has an important role in determining the impact of relationship length 
on collateral and credit pricing. 
Different types of financial institutions respond differently towards different 
relationship dimensions perhaps because of their peculiar circumstances. For 
example, NBFIs are the only institutions that reduce both the collateral and interest 






outreach as compared to banks and this facilitation towards their customers may be 
an effort to retain their customer base. 
 Our results suggest that SMEs face a trade off in terms of effects of 
relationship length. Their relationship with certain types of financial institutions 
reduces interest rates on one hand, while it results in higher collateral on the other.  
Likewise financial institutions which reduce collateral as their relationship length 
with SMEs increases, actually also charge higher interest rates in this situation. 
 Listed companies generally pay lower interest rates and provide less 
collateral as their relationship length with various types of lenders increases. With 
respect to the impact of relationship length on risk premium and collateral, listed 
companies are better off than SMEs and even Government firms. Relatively less 
information asymmetry in case of listed firms may reduce the hold-up problem and 
enable them to bargain a better deal with their lenders. 
 The impact of relationship for Government firms is either insignificant or 
exploitative as it results in higher credit pricing and collateral in case of certain types 
of lenders. Importantly even the public sector financial institutions do not share 
informational advantage with Government firms. On the contrary, public sector 
financial institutions are the only type of lender that exploit Government firms by 
charging higher risk premium when these firms become dependent upon them for 
meeting their financing requirements. Government firms do not have any instance of 
write off in our dataset and further their obligations are implicitly guaranteed by 
Government. Given their better credit risk, these firms should have been able to 
demand better treatment from their lenders.  
 The results imply that firms have to carefully choose the type of financial 
institution with which they want to build a long term relationship. For a particular 
firm, the type of financial institution substantially influences the outcome that 
whether a relationship will be welfare enhancing or exploitative. In addition to 
relationship length, other relationship strength variables like lender’s share and non-
fund based facility also play a significant role in determining the terms of credit. The 






strategy by a firm to achieve favourable outcomes in terms of low interest rate and 
less collateral requirement is not an easy task. 
 Our findings strongly suggest that conflicting empirical findings on the 
subject of relationship lending are the result of dataset limited to certain types of 
borrowers or financial institutions. By using an economy wide exhaustive dataset 
that enables us to exploit variation across various types of financial institutions and 
firms, we show the key role of types of the lender and the borrower in determining 
the impact of relationship length on interest rates and collateral levels. In addition we 
contribute to the literature by examining the role of NBFIs, public sector financial 
institutions and Government owned firms in relationship lending that hitherto has not 
been evaluated. Lastly we add to the literature by examining a developing economy 
where a traditional financial intermediation model still dominates the financial 
market and relationship lending remains relevant owing to the opaque environment 







IT’s NOT WHAT YOU KNOW.  IT’s WHO YOU KNOW.  BANK CEOs AND 
RELATIONSHIP LENDING IN AN EMERGING ECONOMY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Studies of relationship lending have focussed on the relationship between financial 
institutions and borrowers (Kysucky and Norden, 2015). Although Berger and Udell 
(2002) argue that the primary relationship in a bank-borrower association is that of 
loan officer and entrepreneur rather than that of bank and firm, the extant literature 
on the subject has so far largely ignored the role played by individuals’ relationships 
in this association. Especially in emerging economies, due to institutional 
weaknesses, relationships between individuals may be as important as relationships 
between institutions. This paper bridges the gap in literature by examining the impact 
of relationship between a firm and CEO of its bank on terms of credit for the firm – 
specifically risk premium and collateral requirement. On average, we find that 
relationships of firms with CEOs of their banks result in lower risk premia (without 
any impact on collateral) while relationships with banks result in lower collateral 
requirements (without any impact on risk premia). Thus relationship of a firm with 
the CEO of its bank is welfare enhancing in terms of credit pricing while its 
relationship with its bank is welfare enhancing regarding collateral requirement. As 
we found in Chapter 3, our examination by type of bank suggests that the impact of 
the firm-CEO relationship varies from one type of bank to other. These findings 
confirm and extend the results in Chapter 3 that show that the impact of relationships 
varies by types of financial institutions and types of firms.    
The defining feature of relationship lending is the capture of private soft 
information about a borrower that puts the relationship lender at a competitive 
advantage versus other arms-length creditors (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010).43 This 
information is collected through direct and repeated interactions between firm and 
bank officials. The utility of such soft information depends upon a specific bank 
                                                 
43 Soft information refers to the knowledge that is difficult to transmit in numbers, for example, 







official who collects and utilizes this information (Liberti and Mian, 2009). In fact, 
Uchida et al. (2012) find that loan officer turnover adversely affects the 
accumulation of soft information about the borrower. Smaller and medium size firms 
are generally expected to interact at the level of branch while large firms will be, 
directly or indirectly, dealt at a more senior level.  Listed firms, such as those 
examined in this chapter, generally have larger asset base than unlisted firms.44 
These firms must be audited and make their audited financial statement publicly 
available. While credit decision making apparatus vary from bank to bank in 
Pakistan, our discussion with regulators and CEOs of some banks affirm our 
understanding that CEOs play an important role in credit decisions for large size 
borrowers such as listed firms. The longer the CEO of a bank knows a firm, the more 
private information he will have about this firm.45 We, therefore, posit that length of 
relationship between a listed firm and a particular CEO of a bank is an important 
determinant of credit pricing and collateral requirements for the firm.  
The second channel through which relationship of a firm with CEO of its 
lending bank can influence the terms of credit is the importance of personal 
relationships. These personal relationships may be beneficial both for the CEO of the 
bank and firm. The business networks in emerging economies have been found to be 
positively associated with greater credit availability and lower probability of 
financial distress (Khwaja et al., 2011). Empirical research has also found strong 
positive impact of a CEO network, especially his/her connections with CEOs of large 
firms, on their compensation (Engelberg et al., 2013). CEOs of banks may claim 
superior knowledge about the firms they personally know leading to better credit 
decisions and greater opportunities for their banks to generate business. The firms 
may expect preferential treatment from such banks due to their links with CEOs.  
Strong personal relationships are thus potentially beneficial both for CEOs of banks 
as well as firms. The evidence on the impact of private information channel is mixed 
as it can be either exploitative or welfare enhancing (Boot, 2000). Private 
                                                 
44 Listing conditions on a stock exchange generally include a requirement for minimum asset size.  
Further, in our dataset, average loan size of listed firms is much larger than unlisted firms. 
45 This assumption that CEOs of banks personally know large borrowers of their banks is based on our 
discussion with bank regulators and a number of market participants.  We cannot, however, affirm 






information about the borrower delivers a competitive advantage to a relationship 
lender enabling it to make economic gains through better credit decisions. This 
competitive advantage can be shared with the borrower in the form of lower credit 
pricing and collateral and thus can be welfare enhancing for the borrower. However, 
lenders may also use store of this private information as a capturing tool and exploit 
the borrower through higher interest rates and collateral. The personal relationship 
channel between a firm and CEO of its bank should, however, result in better credit 
terms for firms owing to its utility both for the CEOs and firms. 
We use a unique dataset of loans to examine the impact of relationship of a 
firm with the CEO of its bank on credit pricing and collateral requirement for the 
firm.  Our dataset of loans has been sourced from Credit Information Bureau (CIB) 
of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP).46 It includes each and every loan obtained by a 
listed firm from banking system in Pakistan during the period of April 2006 to 
December 2013. In addition, we have obtained from the SBP data about the 
appointment dates of CEOs of all banks in Pakistan. This enables us to identify the 
length of relationship between a particular CEO and a certain firm in addition to 
other relationship variables used in literature. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we could 
not include accounting data (balance sheet, income statement and cash flow 
information) in our estimations since majority of the firms are private. However, in 
this chapter, our examination is confined to listed firms for which annual accounting 
data is available from the SBP. Our estimations in this chapter, therefore, include 
accounting information of the firms as well. 
Our results show the importance of relationship of a listed firm with the CEO 
of its bank. The relationship of a listed firm with CEO of its bank enables it to obtain 
loans at lower risk premium. The relationship with CEO, however, does not have any 
impact on the collateral requirement although collateral requirement declines as 
duration of relationship of a firm with its bank increases. We, however, observe that 
the impact of relationship with CEO differs across different types of banks. The 
relationship of a firm with CEOs of all types of banks is advantageous in terms of 
                                                 







lower credit pricing with the exception of CEOs at foreign banks and small banks.47  
The impact of relationship with CEO on collateral is insignificant except for CEOs 
at large banks and small banks. However, relationship with CEOs of large banks 
results in higher collateral requirements while relationship with CEOs of small banks 
is associated with lower collateral. 
Our results in this Chapter confirm and extend our findings in Chapter 3 that 
type of institution has an important bearing on the impact of relationship lending. It 
is, however, important to note that both results are not directly comparable. In 
Chapter 3, we examine the impact of relationship lending across different types of 
financial institutions that include banks as well as Non-bank financial institutions 
(NBFIs). For example, Government financial institutions in Chapter 3 include 
Government banks as well as NBFIs owned and controlled by Government.  
However, in this chapter, we have confined our analysis to Government banks only 
since the information about appointment of CEOs of NBFIs is not available. 
We contribute to the literature of relationship lending by presenting the first 
study on the impact of relationship of firms with CEOs of their banks. The study also 
provides important insights in the role of personal relationships in credit markets in 
an emerging economy. The findings of the study can be helpful to the banks, firms 
and supervisors of the financial sector especially in emerging markets to understand 
the role of personal relationships in credit markets. 
 
4.2 The Data 
Our final dataset is a combination of data from three sources. Our primary data 
pertaining to information about loans to listed firms has been obtained from credit 
information bureau (CIB) of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The CIB obtains 
information from all financial institutions in Pakistan about their credit transactions 
on monthly basis. The dataset is thus exhaustive since each and every loan made by 
every financial institution in Pakistanis is covered by it. This is the same dataset that 
                                                 
47 We divide banks in Government banks, private banks, domestic banks, foreign banks, large banks 






was used for analysis in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. In this Chapter, however, we have 
included loans extended by banks only since information about CEO appointments is 
available for banks only while in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we used loans extended 
by all financial institutions in Pakistan (that is banks as well as non-bank financial 
institutions).  
The information regarding appointment dates of CEOs of banks has been 
obtained from the SBP.  The SBP approves the appointment of CEO of each bank 
and hence this information is available with the central bank.  This information has 
been added to the loan level dataset, which also includes names of banks as well as 
their specific codes.  The change in CEO of a bank is marked in the dataset as and 
when a new CEO is appointed.  The information reported to the CIB contains all the 
relevant information about a credit transaction like loan limit, outstanding amount or 
amount withdrawn from this loan limit by the borrower, type and amount of 
collateral, overdue amount if any, status of the loan and so on. Since the information 
is submitted on regular periodical basis (at end of each month) to the CIB, we can 
track the status of each loan throughout its life. We supplement this loan dataset with 
yearly financial accounts data of the listed firms, which has also been obtained from 
State Bank of Pakistan.48 The analysis in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 could not take this 
information into account as it is not available for firms other than listed companies.49 
The share price information of listed firms has been obtained from Bloomberg. 
The dataset covers the period from April 2006 to December 2013. We have 
selected April 2006 as starting point since the CIB started collecting information 
about interest rate and collateral – our dependent variables from this date. Our unit of 
analysis is bank-borrower-month, which allows us to track the relationship between a 
bank and a borrower over period of their relationship. After dropping observations 
with missing values, our final dataset contains 70,879 observations pertaining to 395 
listed firms, 38 banks and 78 CEOs of banks.50 
                                                 
48 We use data from yearly financial accounts of listed firms since these accounts are audited and are 
more reliable than quarterly financial statements. 
49 The dataset for analysis in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 relates to about 41,000 firms, most of which are 
private and hence their accounting information is not available. 
50 The number of bank-borrower-month observations in our main dataset is about 3.6 million.  Out of 






 Table 4.1 lists the research variables and their definitions and Table 4.2 
contains the descriptive statistics for these variables. 
The variable relationship length with CEO is primary variable of our interest 
and measures the duration for which a particular CEO and a firm have been related 
(that is the firm has been borrowing from the bank during the tenure of a particular 
CEO).  We measure the duration of this relationship at the end of each month.  
Further the relationship continuous when CEO moves form one bank to another and 
the firm stars borrowing from the other bank.  For example, a firm A started 
borrowing from a bank X in January 2011 (the loan is reported in our dataset on 31st 
January 2011) when a person M was CEO of the bank X.  In June 2011, Mr. M 
resigned from the bank X and moved to bank Y.  The length of relationship between 
firm A and Mr. X at this point in time is 5 months.  In January 2012, the firm A 
obtains a loan from the bank Y.  We measure the length of relationship between firm 
A and Mr. X in February 2012 as 6 months (i.e., 5 months previous relationship and 
1 month existing relationship).  
Relationship length has been widely used in literature to measure the strength 
of relationship (Kysucky and Norden, 2015). Our second key variable is relationship 
length with bank that measure the duration of bank-borrower relationship of a firm.  
As shown in Table 4.2, relationship length with bank is, on average, much longer 
than relationship length with CEO. This may imply that firms value their relationship 
with bank more than their relationship with its CEO. So even when a particular CEO 
leaves a bank, firms continue their relationship with their bank instead of ceasing the 
relationship and following the CEO to other bank. This argument is further supported 




                                                                                                                                          
observations.  The number of observations related to loans from commercial banks to listed firms is 
92,260. We lose 21,381 observations because of missing data. 
51 The average number of bank relationships maintained by listed firms is 6.57 as compared to 3.26 







Variables and their Definitions 
 
No. Name of variable Description 
   
 Relationship with CEO  
1 Relationship length with CEO Number of years a particular CEO and a firm have 
relationship 
   
 Relationship with Bank  
2 Relationship length (years) Number of years a bank and a firm have been in 
lending relationship 
 
3 Number of loans Number of loans obtained by a firm from a particular 
bank 
 
4 Number of financing products Number of types of financing products (like term 
loan, running finance, TFC, bonds, etc.) availed by a 
firm from a particular bank 
 
5 Lender’s share in financing A particular bank’s share in total financing of a 
borrower from the financial sector 
 
6 Non-fund based facility A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a bank has 
granted non-fund based facilities like letter of credit, 
bank guaranty, etc. to a firm in addition to loans. 
   
 Dependent variables  
7 Collateral The value of the total collateral divided by the loan 
limit sanctioned by a bank to a firm 
 
8 Risk premium Risk premium (interest rate less risk free rate) being 
charged by a bank on its loans to a particular 
borrower 
   
 Loan characteristics  
9 Maturity Maturity of loan extended to a firm by a bank 
 
10 Principal Principal outstanding amount of the loan payable by 
a firm on the date of the reporting to the CIB 
   
 Credit history of borrower  
11 Overdues Total overdue amount including principal, interest or 
any other amount owed by a firm to its bank and not 
paid by the due date 
 
12 Default A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm has 
defaulted on its loan to any of its banks, 0 otherwise 
 
13 Litigation A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a firm is in 







14 Write-off A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm has 
availed any sort of write off from any of its lenders 
   
 Type of bank  
15 Foreign bank A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a bank is not 
incorporated in Pakistan, 0 otherwise 
 
16 Large bank A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a bank is large 
in terms of assets and branch network, 0 otherwise 
 
17 Government bank A dummy variable with a value of 1 if a bank is 
owned and controlled by Government, 0 otherwise 
   
 Borrower characteristics  
18 Number of bank relationships Number of banks with which a borrower has lending 
relationships 
 
19 Rating A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm is 
rated either externally or internally by its bank 
 
20 Total assets The total assets of the firm 
 
21 Net profit margin Net profit margin of the firm 
 
22 Current ratio Current ratio of the firm 
 
23 Debt equity ratio Debt equity ratio of the firm 
 
24 Intangible assets Intangible assets to total assets ratio 
 
25 Share price to book The ratio of share price to its book value 
 
26 PPE The ratio of property, plant and equipment to total 
assets 
Note: This Table presents definitions of the variables used in analyses.  The explanatory variables have been 
grouped into various categories:  relationship with CEO, relationship with bank, borrower characteristics, credit 










Descriptive Statistics for Variables Excluding Dummies 
(Amounts are in Pakistan Rupees Millions) 
 
Name of variable Mean St.Dev Percentiles 
p-10* p-25* p-50* p-75* p-90* 
Relationship with CEO    
Relationship length 
      
2.92  
       
2.69  
       
0.33  
       
1.00  
       
2.17  
       
4.00  
       
6.67  
        
Relationship with Bank   
Relationship length 
      
6.83  
       
5.30  
       
1.50  
       
3.00  
       
5.59  
       
8.94  
     
14.09 
Number of loans 
      
4.95  
       
6.31  
       
1.00  
       
2.00  
       
3.00  
       
6.00  
     
10.00 
Number of financing products 
      
2.98  
       
1.86  
       
1.00  
       
1.00  
       
3.00  
       
4.00  
       
6.00  
Lender's share in financing 
      
0.29  
       
0.30  
       
0.03  
       
0.07  
       
0.17  
       
0.41  
       
0.89  
Dependent variables            
Collateral ratio 
      
1.51  
       
1.28  
       
0.62  
       
1.00  
       
1.10  
       
1.54  
       
2.71  
Interest rate 
   
12.59 
       
3.21  
       
9.00  
    
10.54 
     
12.88  
     
14.79  
     
16.13 
        
Loan characteristics               
Maturity 
      
4.58  
       
6.70  
       
0.58  
       
1.00  
       
3.00  
       
5.67  
       
8.50  
Principal  280     370 
       
0.84  
    
34.00    140    370    740 
        
Credit history of the borrower 
Overdues 
   
22.00 
      
96.00  
       
-    
       
-    
        
-    
        
-    
     
18.00 
Borrower characteristics        
Number of banks 
   
6.57  
       
4.42  
       
2.00  
       
3.00  
     
6.00  
     
9.00  
     
13.00 
Total assets 
   
15.00 
      
31.00  
       
0.74  
       
1.70  
       
4.50  
     
14.00  
     
34.00 
Net profit margin 
-    
0.11  
       
0.24  
-       
0.13  
-     
0.01  
       
0.03  
       
0.08  
       
0.13  
Current ratio 
      
1.37  
       
1.28  
       
0.47  
       
0.74  
       
0.97  
       
1.24  
       
1.79  
Debt ratio equity 
      
0.02  
       
0.41  
       
0.00  
       
0.01  
       
0.02  
       
0.03  
       
0.05  
Intangible assets 
      
0.01  
       
0.03  
       
-    
       
-    
        
-    
       
0.00  
       
0.00  
Price to book ratio 
      
1.34  
       
5.77  
       
0.14  
       
0.26  
       
0.56  
       
1.22  
       
2.22  
PPE to assets 
      
0.51  
       
0.20  
       
0.25  
       
0.36  
       
0.51  
       
0.66  
       
0.78  
Note: This Table presents descriptive statistics for variables (excluding dummies) used in analysis. 










The manner in which both of our variables: relationship length with CEO and 
relationship length with bank are being measured, may give the impression of an 
overlap. However, number of CEOs in our dataset is more than double the number of 
banks. This reflects reasonable degree of turnover and provides assurance that both 
of our variables are estimating distinct dimensions.52  
The literature has used number of loans, range of products and reliance on a 
particular lender as other measures of bank-borrower relationship (Kysucky and 
Norden, 2015). We have used number of loans, number of financing products, 
lender’s share in financing and non-fund based facility as other measures of strength 
of bank-borrower relationship in Chapter 3. The results of our analysis in Chapter 3 
show that these variables have significant impact on terms of credit. We have 
accordingly included these variables in our estimations in this Chapter as well. 
We intend to estimate the impact of our relationship variables on collateral 
and risk premium. We scale collateral by sanctioned loan limit to neutralize the size 
of the loan.53 We also subtract risk free rate from interest rate to obtain risk premium 
since it is a better measure of risk that a lender associates with a borrower.54 
Loan characteristics and credit history of a borrower are important 
determinants of collateral and interest rate and we have, therefore, added them as 
explanatory variables. Type of a financial institution has been found to play an 
important role in the dynamics of bank-borrower relationships (Berger and Black, 
2011; Kano et al., 2011). We use three dummy variables to characterize the type of a 
bank. We treat a bank as a foreign bank if it is not incorporated in Pakistan. The 
                                                 
52 The number of CEOs in our dataset is more than double the number of banks.  The number of 
observations where relationship length with CEO is equal to relationship length with bank is only 191 
out of the sample size of 70,879 observations.  Further the correlation between relationship length 
with CEO and relationship length with bank is 0.39, which we feel is not problematic.  We also 
control for relationship length with bank while estimating the impact of relationship length with CEO 
in a multivariate regression setting.  Moreover, the regression coefficient values of both the variables, 
relationship length with CEO and relationship length with bank, range from -0.145 to 0.237 and -
0.239 to 0.122 respectively as shown in Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.  In case of an issue of 
collinearity, the coefficient values would have shown an abnormal behaviour. 
53 The greater size of a loan would essentially require higher level of collateral. 
54 We use rate of return on Government 3 months treasury bills as risk free rate, which was obtained 






banks owned and controlled by Government are treated as Government banks.55  
There are five large banks in Pakistan in terms of assets and branch network and 
these have been identified as large banks in our estimations (we accordingly term the 
other banks as small banks). In terms of the range of financial institutions, there is an 
important difference between our analysis in Chapter 3 and this Chapter. The 
analysis in Chapter 3 uses data related to all types of financial institutions - banks as 
well as NBFIs. Thus domestic financial institutions include domestic banks as well 
as domestic NBFIs. However, in this chapter, our data set is restricted to banks only 
because of lack of CEO appointment information about NBFIs. 
The number of banking relationships is an important determinant of credit 
supply (Detragiache et al., 2000) and especially firms in economies with weak 
judicial system and creditors rights regime have been found to have more bank 
relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2000). In addition to number of bank relationships, 
we include rating and a number of variables representing financial position of the 
borrower as control variables in our models. 
 
4.3 Estimation Methodology 
As discussed in section 4.2, we use a subsample (related to loans from banks to listed 
firms only) of the dataset used in Chapter 3. Further we examine the impact of 
relationship length (with banks as well as CEOs of banks) on collateral and risk 
premium as we did in Chapter 3. Given the similarities in data, we use the same 
estimation methodology, which we adopted in Chapter 3. For estimating risk 
premium, we use the following multivariate GLS regression panel model with 
random effects (Greene, 2000): 
Y*it =  + Xit  + εit+ νi 
                                                 
55 There are a number of banks where Government has a shareholding but these banks are controlled 
(through their board of directors) and managed by private sector.  We have included only those banks 
as Government banks in which Government has both the majority shareholding and has the power to 






X is our vector of independent variables while εit is observation specific error 
term and νi is unit specific error term.   We use the following Tobit panel model that 
employs maximum likelihood approach for estimating collateral:  
Y*it = Xit  + εit+ μi 
Y* is a latent variable, observable for values greater than zero and censored 
otherwise. X, as in previous model, is a vector of independent variables. μi is the unit 
specific error term. Unit specific error term differs between units but for a specific 
unit like a particular firm in our case, its value is constant. εit is the observations 
specific error term. 
We use the same approach adopted in Chapter 3 (described at page 62 in 
detail) to deal with the potential issue of endogeneity.56For each dependent variable, 
take risk premium, we run the model without including the other three variables with 
which we have, a priori, the potential issue of endogeneity: principal, risk premium 
and maturity. We then introduce these variables one by one in the next estimations. 
As we show in section 4.4, our results remain the same across those variations 
providing evidence that the results we present in this Chapter are robust to 
considerations of endogeneity. 
We start our estimations, using whole of our dataset, to assess the impact of 
our relationship variables on collateral and risk premium. In the next stage, however, 
we split our dataset by type of banks to examine how a certain type of bank affects 
this relationship. We split the dataset using six different types of banks – 
Government banks, private banks, foreign banks, domestic banks, large banks and 
small banks. These categories, however, are not mutually exclusive. For example, 
domestic banks include Government banks and likewise private banks include 
foreign banks. The objective of this exercise is to understand the impact of a 
particular type of bank on relationship under examination since our results in Chapter 
                                                 
56 It can be argued that collateral, risk premium (our dependent variables), loan amount (principal) 






3 show that type of financial institutions substantially impacts the direction and size 
of the impact of relationship on collateral and risk premium. 
 
4.4 Results 
We first discuss the impact of relationships with CEO and banks on risk premium 
and credit pricing for listed firms. We then follow up this discussion with the impact 
that type of bank has on these results. 
 
4.4.1 The Impact of relationship with CEO and bank on credit pricing 
The results of our first set of estimations relating to impact of relationship length and 
other variables on risk premium of a listed firm are presented in Table 4.3.  
The sign and size of the coefficients of all the variables remain almost the same 
across all the four estimations as we gradually introduce potentially endogenous 
variables. The consistency in results provides reasonable assurance of the robustness 
of the estimates. In case, if endogeneity was present, it would have led to 
specification bias and different coefficient estimates. 
 The results show that relationship length with CEO is significantly and 
negatively associated with risk premium whereas relationship length with bank is 
insignificant. This shows that relationship with CEO is welfare enhancing whereas 
relationship with bank does not have any impact on risk premium. The risk premia 
on loans to firms decreases by 4 basis point with each year of its relationship with 
CEO of its bank. This suggests that for a listed firm, it is better to cultivate 
relationship with a particular CEO instead of maintaining relationship with a 










Impact of Relationship Length and other variables on Risk Premium 
Name of variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 




Maturity -0.367*** -0.380*** 
(0.106) (0.106) 
Principal -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Relationship with CEO 
Relationship length with CEO -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Relationship with bank 
Relationship length with bank 0.001 -0.013 -0.009 -0.007 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Number of loans 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of financing products -0.014 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Lender's share in financing -0.099 -0.081 -0.075 -0.039 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Non-fund based facility -0.035 -0.044 -0.049 -0.047 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Credit history of the borrower
Overdues 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Default 0.056 0.052 0.050 0.047 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Litigation 0.786*** 0.794*** 0.792*** 0.784*** 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Write-off -0.201** -0.215** -0.215** -0.220** 
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095) 
Type of bank 
Foreign bank -0.149 -0.357 -0.464 -0.463 
(0.582) (0.589) (0.592) (0.592) 
Large bank -1.028** -1.022** -1.076** -1.074** 
(0.453) (0.452) (0.453) (0.453) 
Government bank 1.819 1.821 1.786 1.788 
(1.174) (1.172) (1.172) (1.177) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of bank relationships -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Rating -0.580*** -0.580*** -0.587*** -0.585*** 






Total assets 0.290*** 0.295*** 0.296*** 0.297*** 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Net profit margin -0.052 -0.054 -0.056** -0.054 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Current ratio 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.013 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Debt equity ratio -0.077 -0.075 -0.075 -0.074 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Intangible assets 2.334*** 2.181*** 2.186*** 2.205*** 
(0.816) (0.815) (0.815) (0.815) 
Share price to book -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Property, plant and equipment -0.094 -0.080 -0.084 -0.085 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
Constant 6.156*** 6.228*** 6.403*** 6.404*** 
(0.911) (0.910) (0.915) (0.924) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Bank dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations 70,879 70,879 70,879 70,879 
R square 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Note: This Table provides results of estimations for risk premium with relationship length variables 
and other control variables.  Equation 1 is basic model and then variables with potential endogeneity 
problem ‘principal’, ‘collateral’ and ‘maturity’ are introduced one by one in the subsequent equations.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
  
 The only other significant relationship variable is number of loans. It is 
significant with coefficient of 0.013. Thus as a firm increases its number of loans 
from a particular bank, the bank starts charging higher risk premium. The number of 
bank relationships does not have any effect on risk premium. 
The coefficients related to the variables under the category of credit history of 
the borrower show that both the overdues and litigation results in higher risk 
premium on loans of a firm. The coefficient of write-off (-0.220), however, seem 
counter intuitive since it shows that borrowers availing themselves of write-off are 
charged lower risk premium by banks. It may, however, also indicate the presence of 






In terms of type of banks, borrowers obtaining loans from large banks are 
charged lower risk premia. Borrowers, which are rated and have higher price to book 
ratio are able to obtain loans at lower rates. Borrowers with a higher proportion of 
intangible assets in their balance sheet have to pay higher risk premium. This result 
may relate to the issues of valuation of intangible assets with potential adverse 
impact on financial position of such firms. The borrowers with greater total assets are 
also charged higher risk premia. While this result may seem counter intuitive, it 
makes sense in the light of our results in Chapter 2, which shows that large 
borrowers take more time in default resolution.  
  
4.4.2 The Impact of relationship with CEO and bank on collateral 
Table 4.4 contains results of estimations examining the impact of relationship length 
and other variables on collateral. 
 As in Table 4.3, the size and sign of all the coefficients remain largely the 
same across all four estimations, supporting the robustness of the results.  While the 
relationship length with CEO is insignificant, the relationship length with bank is 
significant with negative coefficient (-0.040).  Thus a longer relationship with a bank 
helps in reducing the collateral requirements for listed firms.  The number of loans 
and number of financing products are both significant and positive.  This shows that 
as a firm increases the number of loans and acquires different types of financing 
products, its collateral requirements increase.  The banks, however, require less 
collateral if they are the dominant financier of a firm.  This might be expected given 
that these firms maintain multiple banking relationships (the average number of bank 
relationships in our dataset is 6.57), which shows that banks compete for business 
from listed firms.  The variable number of banks itself is also significant and 










Impact of Relationship Length and other variables on Collateral 
Name of variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Risk premium 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
Loan characteristics 
Maturity 0.300*** 0.303*** 
(0.046) (0.046) 
Principal 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Relationship with CEO 
Relationship length with CEO -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Relationship with bank 
Relationship length with bank -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Number of loans 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of financing products 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Lender's share in financing -0.784*** -0.784*** -0.788*** -0.788*** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Non-fund based facility -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Overdues 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Default 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Litigation 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.168*** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Write-off 0.100** 0.100** 0.100** 0.102** 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Type of bank 
Foreign bank -0.327 -0.260 -0.351 -0.352 
(0.234) (0.237) (0.238) (0.238) 
Large bank 0.277 0.276 0.230 0.230 
(0.182) (0.182) (0.181) (0.182) 
Government bank 1.883*** 1.883*** 1.852*** 1.851*** 
(0.474) (0.474) (0.473) (0.473) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of bank relationships -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Rating -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.055*** -0.050*** 






Total assets -0.035** -0.035** -0.036** -0.039** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Net profit margin -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Current ratio -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Debt equity ratio -0.029 -0.030 -0.029 -0.028 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Intangible assets -0.336 -0.337 -0.344 -0.362 
(0.353) (0.353) (0.353) (0.353) 
Share price to book 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Property, plant and equipment 0.005 0.005 0.009 0.009 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Constant 2.063*** 2.040*** 2.193*** 2.201*** 
(0.366) (0.366) (0.367) (0.372) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included 
Bank dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations 70,879 70,879 70,879 70,879 
Log likelihood -91,193 -91,191 -91,162 -91,149 
Note: This Table provides results of estimations for risk premium with relationship length variables 
and other control variables.  Equation 1 is basic model and then variables with potential endogeneity 
problem ‘principal’, ‘collateral’ and ‘maturity’ are introduced one by one in the subsequent equations.  
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 
 
 
 Banks reduce collateral requirements if firms obtain non-fund based facilities 
(letters of credit, guarantees and so on) from them.  Non-funding business generates 
fee based income and is important for banks from the perspective of diversification 
of sources of revenue. Since a diversified revenue base helps in obtaining a better 
credit rating, this incentive may be the reason for this accommodative stance by the 
banks. In terms of type of banks, only variable that is significant is Government 
bank. Government banks require greater collateral as compared to their private 
counterparts. Government banks generally lag behind private banks in adopting 
sophisticated risk management systems. This, in turn, may increase their reliance on 
collateral for mitigating credit risk. The firms with rating, larger assets base, higher 







4.4.3 Role of type of banks in the interplay between relationship variables and 
terms of credit 
Our results in Chapter 3 suggest that type of financial institutions play an important 
role in determining the impact of bank-borrower relationship on collateral and risk 
premium. Accordingly, in order to examine the impact of type of bank on 
interrelationship between relationship variables and terms of credit, we split our 
dataset by different types of banks. We present the results of estimations for risk 
premium and collateral using sub-samples split on the basis of types of bank in 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
Table 4.5 
Estimations with different types of banks – Risk Premium as dependent variable 
 
  Type of bank 
Govt. Private Domestic Foreign Large S&M @ 
Name of variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Collateral -0.003 0.056*** 0.050*** 0.078*** 0.029 0.059*** 
(0.022) (0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.017) (0.010) 
Loan characteristics 
Maturity -0.898*** -0.332*** 0.208 -4.586*** 0.377 -0.372*** 
(0.328) (0.112) (0.110) (0.391) (0.201) (0.122) 
Principal -0.004 -0.032*** -0.021*** -0.044*** -0.030*** -0.026*** 
(0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Relationship with CEO 
Relationship length with CEO -0.145*** -0.026*** -0.053*** 0.237*** -0.126*** 0.018*** 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.004) (0.018) (0.007) (0.005) 
Relationship with bank 
Relationship length with bank 0.077 -0.001 0.061** -0.175*** -0.239*** 0.122*** 
(0.063) (0.029) (0.029) (0.061) (0.050) (0.030) 
Number of loans 0.039*** 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.004 0.009*** 0.023*** 
(0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.031) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of financing products -0.008 0.000 0.005 -0.115*** 0.003 -0.034*** 
(0.030) (0.011) (0.011) (0.044) (0.018) (0.013) 
Lender's share in financing -0.668*** 0.032 0.052 -0.404*** 0.035 -0.038 
(0.133) (0.064) (0.063) (0.153) (0.093) (0.075) 
Non-fund based facility -0.001 -0.074** -0.116*** 0.072 -0.256*** 0.021 
(0.075) (0.035) (0.035) (0.087) (0.061) (0.037) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Overdues 0.032*** 0.059*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.078*** 0.030*** 






Default -0.169 0.088** 0.036 0.131 0.170** -0.058 
(0.099) (0.044) (0.044) (0.096) (0.071) (0.048) 
Litigation 1.112*** 0.682*** 0.839*** -0.310 1.168*** 0.575*** 
(0.118) (0.066) (0.061) (0.203) (0.110) (0.068) 
Write-off -1.220*** 0.363*** -0.297*** 9.985*** -1.274*** 0.334*** 
(0.146) (0.119) (0.096) (1.505) (0.158) (0.119) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of bank relationships 0.024** -0.008 0.005 -0.044*** -0.000 -0.002 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.005) 
Rating -0.074 -0.769*** -1.073*** 0.240** -1.064*** -0.103** 
(0.088) (0.043) (0.045) (0.118) (0.064) (0.049) 
Total assets 0.112 0.349*** 0.386*** -0.212** 0.251*** 0.291*** 
(0.088) (0.040) (0.040) (0.088) (0.069) (0.042) 
Net profit margin -0.080 -0.050 -0.084*** 0.111 -0.118** -0.008 
(0.088) (0.030) (0.031) (0.060) (0.047) (0.034) 
Current ratio 0.074 0.010 0.010 -0.048 0.000 0.016 
(0.049) (0.014) (0.014) (0.046) (0.031) (0.014) 
       
Debt equity ratio 0.205 -0.131** -0.108 0.106 -0.120 -0.156** 
(0.140) (0.066) (0.069) (0.120) (0.095) (0.079) 
Intangible assets 10.781*** 1.662 1.168 8.982*** -3.434 3.852*** 
(3.054) (0.853) (0.908) (1.790) (1.916) (0.871) 
Share price to book -0.010 -0.006 -0.009** -0.012*** -0.010 -0.005 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
Property, plant and equipment -1.170*** 0.043 -0.327*** 0.717*** -0.222 -0.010 
(0.276) (0.117) (0.117) (0.268) (0.197) (0.126) 
Constant 7.790*** 5.953*** 7.610*** 4.620** -0.510 9.505*** 
(2.370) (1.711) (1.421) (1.950) (1.675) (1.437) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Bank dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 8,575 62,304 58,507 12,372 23,463 47,416 
R square 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.24 
Note: This Table provides results for risk premium estimated on sub-samples split by type of bank. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 













Estimations with different types of banks – Collateral as dependent variable 
 
  Type of bank 
Govt. Private Domestic Foreign Large S&M @ 
Name of variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Risk premium -0.001 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.013*** 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Loan characteristics 
Maturity 0.680*** 0.234*** 0.146*** 1.263*** 0.153 0.350*** 
(0.165) (0.048) (0.048) (0.166) (0.080) (0.056) 
Principal -0.014*** 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.001 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Relationship with CEO 
Relationship length with CEO 0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.014 0.012*** -0.011*** 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) 
Relationship with bank 
Relationship length with bank -0.118*** -0.032*** -0.047*** -0.058** -0.084*** -0.021 
(0.032) (0.012) (0.013) (0.026) (0.020) (0.014) 
Number of loans 0.047*** 0.009*** 0.011*** -0.007 0.010*** 0.011*** 
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of financing products 0.071*** 0.024*** 0.052*** -0.092*** 0.062*** 0.012** 
(0.015) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019) (0.007) (0.006) 
Lender's share in financing -0.485*** -0.837*** -0.803*** -0.745*** -0.664*** -0.903*** 
(0.067) (0.027) (0.027) (0.064) (0.037) (0.034) 
Non-fund based facility -0.215*** -0.030** -0.057*** 0.136*** -0.038 -0.045*** 
(0.038) (0.015) (0.015) (0.037) (0.024) (0.017) 
Credit history of the borrower 
Overdues -0.014*** 0.006*** 0.002 0.005 0.004 -0.000 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Default 0.320*** 0.047** 0.048** 0.214*** 0.117*** 0.069*** 
(0.050) (0.019) (0.019) (0.040) (0.028) (0.022) 
Litigation 0.296*** 0.146*** 0.164*** 0.213** 0.166*** 0.185*** 
(0.060) (0.028) (0.027) (0.086) (0.044) (0.031) 
Write-off 0.208*** 0.079 0.111*** -0.700 0.194*** 0.070 
(0.074) (0.051) (0.042) (0.634) (0.063) (0.055) 
Borrower characteristics 
Number of bank relationships -0.029*** -0.010*** -0.022*** 0.038*** -0.022*** -0.003 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Rating -0.177*** -0.030 0.013 0.109** -0.040 -0.086*** 
(0.044) (0.018) (0.020) (0.050) (0.025) (0.023) 
Total assets 0.219*** -0.082*** -0.049*** 0.027 -0.078*** -0.017 
(0.045) (0.017) (0.018) (0.037) (0.027) (0.020) 






Net profit margin -0.122*** -0.031** -0.053*** 0.066*** -0.009 -0.058*** 
(0.045) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) (0.019) (0.016) 
Current ratio 0.206*** -0.034*** -0.012** -0.088*** -0.025** -0.025*** 
(0.024) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.012) (0.006) 
       
Debt equity ratio 0.153** -0.066** 0.001 -0.124** -0.080** 0.008 
(0.070) (0.028) (0.030) (0.050) (0.038) (0.036) 
Intangible assets -6.245*** -0.246 0.056 -1.306 0.353 -0.634 
(1.540) (0.362) (0.396) (0.756) (0.764) (0.401) 
Share price to book 0.000 0.003** 0.000 0.006*** 0.004 0.002 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Property, plant and equipment 0.100 0.013 0.068 -0.208 -0.147 0.084 
(0.139) (0.050) (0.051) (0.113) (0.079) (0.058) 
Constant 2.921** 1.804 4.165*** 0.957*** 1.479*** 3.593*** 
(1.411) (1.100) (0.590) (0.343) (0.435) (0.582) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Bank dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 8,575 62,304 58,507 12,372 23,463 47,416 
Log likelihood -10,774 -80,012 -75,660 -15,074 -29,962 -60,998 
Note: This Table provides results for risk premium estimated on sub-samples split by type of bank. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
** significant at 5% level 
*** significant at 1% level 




The comparison of results across estimations in Table 4.5 alludes to 
important insights regarding the role of type of bank plays in the subject matter under 
consideration. Firstly, the sign of the coefficient of relationship length with CEO 
changes as the type of bank changes. The results show that relationship with a CEO 
of a domestic bank or of a large bank results in lower risk premium. In contrast, 
relationship with CEOs of foreign bank or small banks results in a higher risk 
premium. 
Importantly the sign of the relationship length with bank is opposite to that of 
the relationship length with CEO for domestic as well as foreign banks. Thus, while 
relationships of borrowers with CEOs of domestic banks are welfare enhancing, the 
relationships with a domestic banks, when we do not consider any relationship with 






exploitative but the relationship with foreign banks are welfare enhancing. The 
relationships with large banks and CEOs of large banks are both welfare enhancing 
whereas relationships with small banks and CEOs of such banks are both 
exploitative.  
The impact of relationship with CEO on the collateral required was 
insignificant when we examined it using whole of our dataset in Table 4.4 (discussed 
in section 4.4.2). As we split our dataset across different types of banks in Table 4.6, 
the relationship remains insignificant for four types of banks – Government, private, 
domestic and foreign banks. The relationship, however, becomes significant, and the 
coefficient of relationship length with CEO is positive for large banks and significant 
and negative for small banks. This shows that relationship with CEOs at large banks 
is exploitative (that is, it results in higher collateral requirements) whereas 
relationships with CEOs at small banks is welfare enhancing for firms (results in 
lower collateral requirements). The relationship length with banks, however, are 
associated with lower collateral requirements across all types of banks with the 
exception of small banks. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
We offer first study on the impact of relationship between a firm and CEO of its 
bank on credit pricing and collateral requirements. We find that, on average, 
relationships with CEOs of banks result in lower risk premia for listed firms whereas 
relationships of firms with banks result in lesser collateral requirements. The 
relationship length with banks does not impact credit pricing whereas relationship 
with CEOs of banks does not influence collateral. We also find that the effects of 
relationship length with banks as well as CEOs of banks vary across different types 
of banks. Our findings in this Chapter regarding impact of bank-borrower 
relationship on risk premia and collateral are identical to our results in Chapter 3 and 






The findings of extant literature on relationship lending support both the 
arguments for exploitative relationship and welfare enhancing relationship (Boot, 
2000; Elyasiani and Goldberg, 2004). While we find that all types of banks, except 
small banks, lower collateral requirements as length of their relationship with a firm 
increases, the impact on risk premium varies. Foreign banks and large banks reduce 
risk premium as relationship length increases while domestic banks and small banks 
charge higher risk premium. 
One area of further research on this topic could be to examine the impact of 
relationship with bank and its CEO by splitting dataset into different subsamples 
based on length of relationship with bank versus length of relationship with the CEO 
of the bank.  The results would be helpful in understanding the interplay between 
these two relationships.   
 The findings in this Chapter provide evidence of the importance of personal 
relationships in credit markets in emerging economies. Personal relationships have 
been found to influence a broad range of decisions - from corporate policies of a firm 
(Fracassi, 2016) to merger and acquisitions (Cai and Sevilir, 2012) and higher CEOs 
compensation (Hwang and Kim, 2009). We present the first study on the impact of 
relationship between a firm and CEO of its bank across different types of banks. In 
addition to being the first study on firm-CEOs of banks relationship, we add to the 
literature of personal relationships especially in the context of a developing 









5.1 Summary of Major Findings 
This dissertation contains three papers that examine important issues, both from an 
academic and a professional perspective, using a unique dataset from Pakistan. The 
comprehensiveness of the dataset allows us to examine these issues from a 
completely different perspective than previous literature. 
 The first paper in Chapter 2 examines loan default resolution and access to 
fresh credit by firms after exiting default with particular emphasis on the role of 
collateral and interest rate in these two events. The study finds that collateral 
expedites both the default resolution and access to fresh credit. Higher interest rates 
impede the default resolution process. Small firms resolve default quickly but take 
more time in accessing fresh credit after exiting default. The firms that default with 
more than one lender or have relationships with a greater number of branches of the 
same lender, face difficulty in resolving default. The main bank, largest lender to a 
firm, is helpful both in default resolution and access to fresh credit. 
 The second paper in Chapter 3 analyses the impact of lender-borrower 
relationship on risk premium and collateral requirements. The study finds that the 
types of lender and borrower have important roles in determining the impact of 
lender-borrower relationship on terms of credit. The results suggest that tension in 
empirical findings on this subject is possibly due to data limitations – previous 
studies used datasets that were limited to either certain type of financial institutions 
or certain types of firms. However, one limitation of the current study is a lack of 
firm accounting data. Most of the firms in the dataset are private for which 
accounting information is not available. 
 Third paper in Chapter 4 extends the examination carried out in Chapter 3 by 
looking into the role of relationship of a firm with CEO of its bank and its impact on 
risk premium and collateral requirements. The dataset in this study consists of listed 






length of bank-borrower relationship on risk premium and collateral requirement 
remain the same as in Chapter 3, providing evidence of the robustness of these 
findings. An important role of the CEO relationship on risk premium was also found.  
The impact of relationship of a firm with the CEO of its bank, however, varies by 
type of bank. We have six types of banks in the dataset – Government banks, private 
banks, domestic banks, foreign banks, large banks and small banks. The length of 
relationship of a firm with the CEO of its bank reduces risk premium across all types 
of banks with the exception of foreign banks and small banks. The longer 
relationships with CEO of small banks, however, reduce collateral requirements for a 
firm. 
 
5.2 Policy Implication and Directions for Future Research 
The findings of this dissertation are extremely useful for banks, firms and bank 
regulators alike. An efficient default resolution mechanism is beneficial both for 
financial institutions as well as for firms. The findings in Chapter 2 can assist banks 
in formulating appropriate policies to achieve this end. For example, higher interest 
rates hamper the default resolution process, so that banks may therefore, consider 
easing debt servicing burden for firms that are in trouble. Write-offs reduce the 
duration of default for a firm but are detrimental in accessing fresh credit after firm 
exits default. Firms should therefore, take into consideration problems that they may 
face in raising future debts while requesting their banks for write-offs. 
  The results in Chapter 2 suggest that default with more than one lender 
stretches the period firms remain in default. This may be the result of coordination 
problems between lenders. Previous studies have also found that coordination 
problems between lenders delay default resolution process. Bank regulators may 
therefore, consider putting in place a regulatory framework that facilitates this 
coordination especially during periods of economic stress. The results also suggest 
that small firms face difficulty in accessing fresh credit after exiting default. Lack of 
credit can result in the demise of such firms or at a minimum can seriously repress 






growth, especially in emerging economies. Therefore, financial sector supervisors or 
economic policy makers could consider facilitating small firms that emerge from 
default in accessing fresh credit. The regulatory frameworks for financial institutions 
should also take into cognizance the role of bank-borrower relationships and the 
importance of personal relationships in determining the outcomes of financial 
transactions. 
 The results in Chapter 3 emphasize the importance of the type of firm and 
financial institution in a bank-borrower relationship. The results help in 
distinguishing the lending relationships which are beneficial to firms, from the ones 
which are exploitative. The results suggest that a firm should carefully select the type 
of financial institution while cultivating relationships in order to get optimal benefit. 
The results in Chapter 4 explain the role of personal relationships of a firm with CEO 
of its bank. These results suggest that personal relationships are as important as 
institutional relationships in a developing country. The findings of these Chapters are 
informative and useful for banks, firms and policy makers in emerging economies. 
 The findings of the thesis help us in understanding the dynamics of loan 
default resolution and access to fresh credit in emerging economies. More research is 
needed to understand how the institutional weaknesses (weak creditors regime, 
inefficient judicial system and so on) in emerging economies play out in these 
dynamics. The results of the thesis provide a rationale for tension in empirical 
findings related to relationship lending. Further research can be carried out to 
understand why the impact of relationship lending varies across different dimensions 
of relationship (that is length of relationship, scope of relationship and its 
exclusivity). The results of the thesis suggest an important role of relationship 
between firm and CEO of its bank. Another dimension that can be examined is the 
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